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Abstract
This paper investigates the circumstances under which a central bank
is more or less likely to deviate from the optimal monetary policy rule.
The research questions is addressed in a simple New Keynesian dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model in which monetary pol-
icy deviations occur endogenously. The model solution suggests that
higher future central bank credibility attenuates the current period pol-
icy trade-off between a stable inflation rate and a stable output gap.
Together with the loss of credibility after a policy deviation, this pro-
vides the central bank with an incentive to implement past policy com-
mitments. My main result shows that the central bank is willing to
implement past policy commitments if a sufficient fraction of agents is
not aware of the exact end date of the policy commitment. This find-
ing challenges the time-inconsistency argument against monetary policy
commitments and provides a potential explanation for the repeated im-
plementation of monetary policy commitments in reality.
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1 Introduction
Central banks have recently used more or less explicit policy commitments
to manage public expectations. For example, the Swiss National Bank (SNB)
promised to defend a EUR/CHF exchange rate floor with
”
utmost determi-
nation“ (September 6, 2011). Somewhat less explicit, the Federal Reserve
Bank (Fed)
”
anticipate[d] (...) exceptionally low levels of the federal funds
rate for some time“ (December 16, 2008). Similarly, the European Central
Bank (ECB)
”
expecte[d] the key ECB interest rates to remain at present or
lower levels for an extended period of time“ (Juli 4, 2013).
An open question is, however, under which circumstances a central bank
is more or less likely to deviate from the announced policy path. Moreover, it
is unclear how future central bank credibility interacts with the incentives to
implement past policy commitments. The two research questions are: First,
how does future central bank credibility affect the optimal monetary policy
rule? Second, under which circumstances is it optimal for the central bank to
implement past policy commitments?
This paper connects to various strands of the literature, in particular the
literature on rules versus discretion, the literature on limited commitment in
monetary policy, and the literature on forward guidance. The basic concep-
tual framework dates back to the work of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and
Barro and Gordon (1983a) on rules versus discretion. Their work studies the
permanent temptation to deviate from a policy rule that prescribes a state-
independent, pre-announced inflation rate. Inflation surprises are beneficial
because they reduce the natural unemployment rate towards the time-invariant
efficient unemployment rate which is below the natural unemployment rate.
Both Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983a) find that
policy rules are, in general, not enforceable (i.e. time-inconsistent), unless
a commitment technology is assumed. In an extension, Barro and Gordon
(1983b) investigate enforceable policy rules when the central bank looses repu-
tation from a policy deviation. They find that under such circumstances, policy
rules may be enforceable if they are sufficiently close to the discretionary policy
prescription.
The current debate on time-inconsistency of monetary policy rules is related
to the central bank’s optimal response to an exogenous inflation shock. Such
a cost-push shock drives a temporary wedge between the natural output level
and the efficient output level. In other words, the debate shifted away from
the central bank’s permanent temptation to overstimulate as in Kydland and
Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983a) towards the central bank’s
1
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temporary temptation to deviate from the optimal monetary policy rule. More
specifically, following Gaĺı (2015), Woodford (2005), and Clarida et al. (1999),
a central bank faces a policy trade-off in the presence of a cost-push shock:
Either it stabilizes the inflation rate or it stabilizes the output gap. The optimal
response to a cost-push shock is to smooth the response of the inflation rate
and the output gap over time. Under full commitment, the central bank can
deliver such an outcome, even though the optimal policy path may be time-
inconsistent.1 In contrast, under discretion a central bank lacks the credibility
to effectively commit to a future policy path. Being constrained by that, the
central bank must (sub-optimally) react more forcefully in the period when
the cost-push shock hits.
Problematically, both full commitment and discretion are implausible on
theoretical and empirical grounds. Concerning full commitment, it is unclear
how a central bank can prevent itself from a favorable policy deviation once
time passes. Monetary policy decisions are usually taken by a committee in
which individual members serve for some years only. Consequently, later co-
horts can overturn commitments of earlier cohorts. Discretion, on the other
hand, has become a less appealing concept in light of recent monetary policy
conduct (”forward guidance”): It seems implausible to assume that a central
bank issues a statement regarding its future policy conduct without any inten-
tion to deliver. For example, Woodford (2012) argues that any form of forward
guidance is in part interpreted as a policy commitment with some, but limited
commitment.
As a consequence, researchers have recently started to study limited com-
mitment in optimal monetary policy, as for example Debortoli et al. (2014),
Debortoli and Lakdawala (2014), and Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007). In
their models, the central bank is exogenously selected to deviate from past
policy commitments with a time-invariant, state-independent probability. My
work suggests that such a time-invariant limited commitment scenario is not
fully compatible with strategic policy decisions: In fact, central bank credibility
(which is defined as the probability with which the central bank commitment
is expected to be implemented in the future) is either time-varying or equal to
one of the two extreme cases (full credibility or zero credibility).
1Barro and Gordon (1983a, 599-600) argue that it is ”deceptive” to term a policy rule
”time-inconsistent” when ”policymakers [have] incentives to deviate from the rule when
agents expect it to be followed.” They claim that ”the incentives to deviate from the rule
are irrelevant, since commitments are assumed to be binding. Thus, the time-inconsistency
of the optimal solution is (...) irrelevant when commitments are feasible.” Somewhat less
restrictive, Clarida et al. (1999) define time-consistency as the absence of ”incentives to
change its plans in an unexpected way.” I will use the latter definition of time-consistency.
2
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Some of the literature on forward guidance also considers with monetary
policy commitments. Bodenstein et al. (2012), for example, define forward
guidance as the explicit commitment to implement policy in accordance with
the optimal monetary policy rule under time-invariant limited credibility. Sim-
ilar to Debortoli et al. (2014), the timing of a policy deviation is, however,
exogenous, provoking outcomes which are inconsistent with basic economic
logic, namely policy deviations when the implementation of past policy com-
mitments would have delivered a higher welfare. Such outcomes are ruled out
in my model.
Haberis et al. (2014) model forward guidance as an imperfectly credible
interest rate peg. They assume that the central bank’s credibility increases
with a (time-varying) fixed cost associated to a policy deviation. My model
is more transparent about the nature of this cost: A policy deviation is costly
because it is associated to higher future macroeconomics volatility, arising from
the assumption that the central bank looses all its credibility forever as soon
as it first deviates from the announced policy path. Furthermore, in Haberis
et al. (2014), the actual decision of whether or not to implement past policy
commitments is (yet again) just a coin-toss. It is hence subject to the critique
that this may force the central bank to deviate even though it would have
preferred to deliver.
In sum, my paper investigates the effects of future central bank credibility
on the optimal monetary policy rule, as well as the circumstances under which
a central bank is more or less likely to deviate from the announced policy
path. It applies a simple New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilib-
rium (DSGE) model in which the central bank decides strategically whether
or not to honor past policy commitments. Endogenous policy deviation come
with a permanent and complete loss of central bank credibility, i.e. higher
macroeconomic volatility in the future.
My results show that higher future expected central bank credibility at-
tenuates the current period policy trade-off between a stable inflation rate
and a stable output gap. This provides the central bank with an incentive to
implement past policy commitments. I find that the central bank is willing
to implement past policy commitments if a sufficient fraction of agents is not
aware of the exact end date of the policy commitment.
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 derives the
solution to the optimal monetary policy problem under limited credibility.
Furthermore, it introduces the notion of strategic policy decisions. Section 3
presents the results of the analysis. Section 4 concludes.
3
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2 Model
2.1 Model Environment And Optimal Monetary Policy
I analyze optimal monetary policy with strategic policy deviations and
limited commitment in a simple New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) model similar to Gaĺı (2015).
U0 = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
C1−σt − 1
1− σ
− N
1+ϕ
t
1 + ϕ
)
(1)
Ct =
(∫ 1
0
C
ε−1
ε
it di
) ε
ε−1
(2)
The representative household maximizes its utility function (equation 1)
which is additively separable in a consumption bundle (Ct) and leisure (1 −
Nt). β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor of the household, σ ≥ 0 the constant
relative risk aversion or, equivalently, the inverse intertemporal elasticity of
substitution, and ϕ ≥ 0 the inverse of the Frisch labor supply elasticity, i.e.
the inverse wage elasticity of hours worked (Nt). A taste for variety over
intermediary consumption goods Cit enters via the Dixit-Stiglitz (Dixit and
Stiglitz (1977)) aggregator (equation 2) in which the elasticity of substitution
is given by ε ∈ (1,∞).
PtCt +QtBt+1 −WtNt −Dt −Bt = 0 (3)
The household problem is subject to a sequence of dynamic budget con-
straints (equation 3) and a No-Ponzi condition. Pt denotes the price level, Qt
the period t price of a risk-free security Bt+1 which pays one unit in period
t+ 1, Wt the nominal wage, and Dt the (aggregated) nominal firm profit.
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive firms on the interval
[0, 1], each producing a single differentiated intermediary output good Yit with
a linear technology Yit = Nit (with Nit being the labor demand of firm i).
As in Calvo (1983), in every period a firm decides on a new price Pti of its
output good with probability 1 − θ. Yt+k|t is the output of a firm that last
reset its price in period t, Ct+k(Yt+k|t) the associated nominal cost function,
and Λt,T ≡ βT−t UC,TUC,t the stochastic discount factor.
4
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∞∑
k=0
θkEt
[
Λt,t+k
1
Pt+k
(
P ∗t Yt+k|t − Ct+k(Yt+k|t)
)]
(4)
Yt+k|t =
(
P ∗t
Pt+k
)−ε
Ct+k (5)
If selected to change its price, firm i maximizes the period t market value of
its current and discounted future expected real profits over P ∗t (expression 4),
subject to a sequence of demand constraints (equation 5). The log-linearized
non-policy equilibrium of the model is given by the dynamic IS equation (6)
and the New Keynesian Philipps curve (7)
xt = Etxt+1 −
1
σ
(it − Etπt+1 − ρ) (6)
πt = κxt + βEtπt+1 + ut (7)
where xt is the efficient output gap, πt the inflation rate, ut the cost-push
shock, it the nominal interest rate, ρ the steady state real interest rate, and
κ ≡ ξ(σ + ϕ) with ξ ≡ (1−θ)(1−βθ)
θ
.2
The central bank is a benevolent planer who aims at maximizing the welfare
of the representative household. Borrowing from Gaĺı (2015) and Woodford
(2005), the welfare loss function is approximated by
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
1
2
(π2t + ϑx
2
t ) (8)
if the central bank operates under full commitment, i.e. if commitments
are honored with probability 1. The weight of the output gap in the welfare
loss function is given by ϑ ≡ ξ
ε
(σ + ϕ).3
Naturally, the central bank can only control the household’s expectations in
as far as the household anticipates the central bank to honor its commitments.
This is important because the allocations off the path on which commitments
are honored are exogenous to the central bank problem.
2Details of the derivation are provided in the appendix, section 5.1.
3Details of the derivation are provided in the appendix, section 5.3.
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2.2 Optimal Monetary Policy under Limited Commitment
Building on the work of Debortoli and Lakdawala (2014) and Debortoli et
al. (2014), who derive the welfare loss function under limited commitment, I
additionally introduce time-variation in central bank credibility.4
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
t−1∏
i=0
γi
1
2
(π2t + ϑx
2
t ) (9)
where γt denotes the central bank’s credibility in period t and
∏−1
i=0 γi = 1.
Note that γ0 (rather than γ1) is associated to (x1, π1) because the probability
with which the household expects the period 0 commitment to be implemented
in period 1 is governed by the central bank’s credibility in period 0. The policy
problem is subject to the New Keynesian Phillips curve
πt = κxt + βγtEtπt+1 + β(1− γt)Etπdt+1 + ut (10)
where Etπt+1 is the inflation rate that is expected to prevail if commitments
are honored in period t + 1 and Etπdt+1 the inflation rate that is expected to
prevail if the central bank deviates from the announced policy path in period
t+ 1. Assume that the inflation rate which is expected to prevail if the central
bank reneges on past policy commitment in t+1 is an arbitrary (linear) function
of the state variable(s) in t + 1. Formally, assume Etπdt+1 = Etft+1(ut+1)
with the (time-varying) functional form of ft+1 unknown. Expressed as a
Lagrangian, the central bank problem is
L =E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
t−1∏
i=0
γi
{
1
2
(π2t + ϑx
2
t ) + λt
(
πt − κxt
− βγtπt+1 + β(1− γt)ft+1(ut+1)− ut
)} (11)
with λt being the Lagrange multiplier associated to the New Keynesian
Phillips curve in period t.5 Combining and iterating on the first order condi-
tions with respect to πt and xt yields
xt = −
κ
ϑ
[πt + πt−1 + . . .+ π0 − λ−1] (12)
4The derivation is provided in the appendix, section 5.4.
5The derivation of the model solution is provided in the appendix, section 5.5.
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if γi > 0 ∀i ∈ {0, . . . , t − 1}.6 By construction, deviations from the an-
nounced policy path in period t imply λt−1 = 0, as in Debortoli et al. (2014).
7
Consequently, with t = 0 being the initial period of the policy plan
xt = −
κ
ϑ
p̂t (13)
where p̂t ≡ πt + p̂t−1 and p̂−1 = 0.8 For t > 0, the optimal output gap
depends not only on the current inflation rate but also on lagged inflation
rates. That is, there is a history dependence in the optimal output gap. This
finding previews the result that under (limited) credibility it is both possible
and optimal to commit to future policy responses when facing a current period
cost-push shock. The reason is that such a commitment affects the household’s
expectations which in turn affect current period variables (in particular, the
inflation rate). Consequently, less of a current period variability in the output
gap is necessary to achieve the optimal inflation rate. This is beneficial because
the welfare loss function is strictly convex in the inflation rate and the output
gap. To solve the model, re-express the New Keynesian Phillips curve in terms
of p̂t.
p̂t = µt
[
p̂t−1 + βγtEtp̂t+1 + β(1− γt)Etπdt+1 + ut
]
(14)
with µt ≡ ϑϑ(1+βγt)+κ2 . Suppose ut ∼ AR(1) with E(ε
u
t ) = 0 and V (ε
u
t ) =
σ2εut and guess the time-varying solution for p̂t to be a linear function of p̂t−1
and ut.
ut = ρuut−1 + ε
u
t (15)
p̂t = atp̂t−1 + ctut (16)
6With γ0 = 0, the central bank’s first order condition is xt = −κϑπt.
7Suppose λ−1 = 0. Then, from equation 146 and 148 it follows that x0 = −κϑπ0 which
is the the optimality condition for the period in which the policy plan is first implemented
(cf. Gaĺı (2015, 130, 135)). In other words, setting the non-physical λ−1 = 0 is akin to a
deviation from the announced policy path in period 0.
8In the period of the policy implementation (t = 0), the ratio between the inflation rate
and the output gap is independent of central bank credibilities. However, the level of the
inflation rate and the output gap changes with {γt}Tt=0 (cf. equation 20).
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Further guess the time-varying (linear) solution πdt = ĥtut with ĥt unknown.
Finally, assume that the central bank implements the discretionary solution
with certainty in T + i ∀i ≥ 1. Analyzing a finite period model (T < ∞) is
useful because it allows to solve the model by backward iteration without any
meaningful loss of economic substance. In particular, as of period T , the only
optimal monetary policy rule consistent with rational expectations and perfect
information is the discretionary optimal monetary policy rule. This is because
the unique set of central bank credibility consistent with rational expectations
and perfect information is γT+i = 0 ∀i ≥ 0.9
If a policy deviation occurs in period t, the central bank credibility is lost
completely and permanently, i.e. γt+i = 0 ∀i ≥ 1. Plug the guess for p̂t (equa-
tion 16) and the guess for πdt into the re-expressed Phillips curve (equation 14)
and solve recursively for at ∈ (0, 1).
p̂t =
µt
1− µtβγtat+1
[
p̂t−1 + (1 + βγtct+1ρu + β(1− γt)ĥt+1ρu)ut
]
(17)
at =
µt
1− µtβγtat+1
∀ t (18)
Realize that a deviation from the announced policy path in t requires p̂t−1 =
0 (cf. equation 13). From the guess for p̂t (equation 16) we know that p̂
d
t = ctut.
Furthermore, by definition, p̂dt = π
d
t . Because I assume π
d
t = ĥtut it must be
that ĥt = ct ∀t. Solve recursively for ct ∀t ∈ {0, . . . , T}, using {at}T+1t=0 from
above.
ct =
µt(1 + βct+1ρu)
1− µtβγtat+1
∀t ∈ {0, . . . , T} (19)
with cT+i =
ϑ
κ2+ϑ(1−βρu) ∀i ≥ 1 as in Gaĺı (2015, 130). The optimality
condition (equation 13), together with the guess for p̂t (equation 16) and the
solution for the coefficients (in particular, ct = ĥt) yields the time-varying
model solution for γt ∈ (0, 1)
xt = atxt−1 −
ĥtκ
ϑ
ut (20)
9So far, γt is not constrained to be consistent with rational expectations and perfect
information. In other words, γT > 0 is, in principle, possible even though the central bank
implements the discretionary solution in period T + 1 with certainty.
8
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where µt ≡ ϑϑ(1+βγt)+κ2 ∀t, at =
µt
1−µtβγtat+1 ∀t, ĥt =
µt(1+βĥt+1ρu)
1−µtβγtat+1 ∀t ∈
{0, . . . , T}, and ĥT+i = ϑκ2+ϑ(1−βρu) ∀i ≥ 1.
The output gap xt depends on the entire sequence of current and future
central bank credibilities {γj}Tj=t. More specifically, {γj}Tj=t determines the
optimal persistence in the output gap as well as the severity of the policy
trade-off.
As a result of the classic policy trade-off, the central bank optimally com-
mits to a conditional (future) deflation in response to a positive cost-push
shock. Crucially, to decrease Etπt+1 sufficiently, the central bank must an-
nounce a more pronounced deflation, the shorter the horizon over which the
central bank is expected to implement the policy commitment. In other words,
the central bank must implement a more persistent (negative) output gap, the
sooner the central bank is expected to return to a discretionary mode. For-
mally, the lower T and/or the lower the values in {γj}Tj=t, the higher at.
The degree to which the household’s expectations adjust to policy com-
mitments determines the severity of the policy trade-off between the output
gap and the inflation rate in period t. More specifically, if the (representative)
household expect the policy commitment to be implemented over a shorter
horizon, the policy trade-off becomes more severe (ĥt rises).
To illustrate, assume that the central bank’s optimal policy is a commit-
ment to a (conditional) future deflation. Since the inflation rate can be ex-
pressed as a (positive) function of discounted future expected output gaps,
Etπt+1 is ceteris paribus higher, the lower T and/or the lower the values in
{γj}Tj=t. From above, we know that this off-equilibrium increase in Etπt+1 in-
duces the central bank to commit to a higher persistence in the output gap.
However, households discount future expected inflation rates and incur con-
vex losses from xt and πt. For this reason, the (off-equilibrium) rise in Etπt+1
cannot be offset completely by the central bank’s optimal commitment to a
higher persistence in the output gap. It is for that reason that the current
period policy trade-off accentuates. Formally, the lower T and/or the lower
the values in {γj}Tj=t, the higher the impact coefficient (ĥt).
2.3 Strategic Deviations in Optimal Monetary Policy
In contrast to previous work on limited commitment in optimal monetary
policy, I allow the central bank to take strategic policy decisions. More specifi-
cally, the central bank can either honor past policy commitments or deviate. It
delivers on past policy commitments if and only if the value of doing is strictly
greater than the value associated to a policy deviation.
9
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Introducing strategic policy deviations is important for two reasons. First,
it shows under which circumstances a central bank is more or less likely to
deviate from the announced policy path. Debortoli et al. (2014) were the first
who adressed this question: They report the potential welfare gains of a policy
deviation over the horizon of the impulse response function to a cost-push
shock. My work complements their analysis by showing that the temptation
to deviate is not only time-dependent, but also state-dependent.
Second, the introduction of strategic policy deviations provides an endoge-
nous criterion based on which we can assess whether or not the central bank
would deviate from past policy commitments. This debate seemed to be re-
solved because the static perspective suggests that it is always weakly prefer-
able to implement the discretionary solution. My work shows that there are
dynamic considerations which induce the central bank to implement past policy
commitments. More specifically, if for some reason it is optimal to implement
policy commitments in the future, it may also become optimal to honor policy
commitments today.
The strategic policy problem is a recursive representation of the central
bank optimization problem (equation 9) that takes into account that the con-
tinuation values differ depending on the central bank’s policy choice. Impor-
tantly, it is assumed that the central bank looses all its credibility forever as
soon as it first deviates from the announced policy path. Proposition 2 proves
that the complete and permanent loss of credibility implies policy deviations
in every future period. In contrast, if the central bank honors past policy com-
mitments in t, it can (again) take a strategic policy decision in t+1. Formally,
V dt (ut) = max{xt+s,πt+s}∞s=0
Udt + βEtV dt+1(ut+1) (21)
V ht (xt−1, γt−1, ut) = max{xt+s,πt+s}∞s=0
Uht + βEtVt+1(xt, γt, ut+1) (22)
Vt(xt−1, γt−1, ut) = max
{
V dt (ut), V
h
t (xt−1, γt−1, ut)
}
(23)
U it = −
1
2
(π2t,i + ϑx
2
t,i) (24)
where V dt denotes the value associated to a policy deviation in period t, V
h
t
the value associated to honored commitments in period t, and U it the period
objective function of the central bank evaluated at the optimal xt,i and πt,i, i.e.
evaluated at the xt,i and πt,i which satisfy the optimal monetary policy rule
under limited credibility (equation 20 and equation 150). xt,i and πt,i depend
on the central bank’s policy choice i ∈ {d, h} where d stands for a policy
deviation and h stands for the implementation of past policy commitments.
10
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2.4 The Driving Process and Model Calibration
The driving force is a cost-push shock ujt which evolves according to a
2-state Markov process where the (discrete) magnitude of ujt is indexed by
j ∈ {L,H}. Formally, [
uHt
uLt
]
=
[
pH,H 1− pL,L
1− pH,H pL,L
][
uHt−1
uLt−1
]
(25)
where 1−pL,L denotes the probability of transitioning from the low state L
to the high state H (which is associated to uHt ). Let u
H
t = −uLt with uHt > uLt
and assume, for simplicity, that pH,H = pL,L = 0.5.
The model is calibrated to quarterly data as suggested in Gaĺı (2015, 67).
In particular, β = 0.99 (implying a annualized steady state real interest rate
of approximately 4%), ε = 9 (implying a steady state mark-up of 12.5%),
α = 0 (reflecting a simplifying constant returns to scale assumption), σ = 1
(log-utility), ψ = 5 (implying a Frisch elasticity of the labor supply equal to
0.2), θ = 0.75 (implying an average duration of a price equal to four quarters),
ρu = 0 (where not stated otherwise), and u
H
t = 0.005.
2.5 A Simple Model With Strategic Policy Deviations
Suppose t = {0, 1, 2, 3}, with T = 2, and assume x−1 = 0. The central
bank decides strategically whether or not to deviate from the optimal monetary
policy rule in t = {0, 1, 2}. In period T + 1, the central bank implements the
discretionary solution with certainty.
Consistency with rational expectations requires that the agents’ beliefs
about the number of states in which a policy deviation occurs coincide with
the actual number of states in which a policy deviation occurs. For example,
γt = 1 is consistent with rational expectations and perfect information if and
only if the central bank implements past policy commitments in period t + 1
independent of the realization of ut+1. γt = 0.5 is consistent if and only if
past policy commitments are implemented in exactly one state in period t+ 1
(provided that ut+1 can only take on two values), and γt = 0 is consistent if the
central bank reneges on past policy commitments in period t+ 1 independent
of the realization of ut+1.
Future central bank credibility affects the optimal allocation in period t
via two channels: Directly via the optimal future allocation (i.e. via Etπt+1)
and indirectly via today’s solution coefficients (at and ht). For this reason,
we must assess the consistency of each γi conditional on an entire sequence of
11
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{γt}Tt=i rather than conditional on γi only. A consistent sequence of {γt}Tt=0 is
a sequence in which every individual γt is consistent.
3 Results
In response to a positive cost-push shock, the central bank cannot simul-
taneously stabilize the inflation rate and the output gap. Because the central
bank objective function is convex in πt and xt, it is moreover suboptimal to
either stabilize the inflation rate or the output gap. Consequently, the optimal
response to a positive cost-push shock consists of a positive inflation rate and
a negative output gap. The implementation of a negative output gap exerts
negative pressure on the inflation rate and partly offsets the (off-equilibrium)
rise in the inflation rate caused by the positive cost-push shock. Furthermore,
the optimal policy path involves a commitment to a prolonged (conditional)
recession which is accompanied by a negative inflation rate.
3.1 Future Central Bank Credibility and Current Period Allocation
The optimal monetary policy rule with strategic policy deviations shows
that the persistence in the output gap (at) as well as the severity of the
policy trade-off (ĥt) depend on current and future central bank credibilities
(γt+i ∀i ≥ 0). These central bank credibilities may be time-varying. My
model is hence flexible enough to study the effect of future (time-varying) cen-
tral bank credibilities on the current optimal monetary policy rule. By that, it
advances on the research of Gaĺı (2015), Woodford (2005) and Debortoli et al.
(2014) who implicitly assume a time-invariant optimal monetary policy rule.
To illustrate the dependence of the optimal monetary policy rule on fu-
ture central bank credibilities, consider two simulations (indexed by j) with
a deterministic sequence of central bank credibilities {γjt }T+1t=0 (where T = 2)
and a deterministic sequence of cost-push shocks {ut}T+1t=0 = {H, 0, 0, 0}. In
simulation a, the central bank credibilities are {γat }T+1t=0 = {1, 1, 1, 0} and in
simulation b they are {γbt}T+1t=0 = {1, 1, 0, 0}. Policy commitments are assumed
to be honored in t ∈ {0, 1, 2} but not in t = 3.10
How does future central bank credibility affect the optimal monetary policy
rule? Let us first investigate how the optimal persistence in the output gap
10γt = 0 does not per se imply a policy deviation in period t. It only reflects the central
bank’s inability to credibly commit to a future policy path. In other words, γt = 0 does
not, per se, refrain the central bank from implementing past policy commitments. Similarly,
γt−1 = 1 does not per se imply honored commitments in period t because γt−1 solely
reflects the probability with which the agents expect future central bank commitments to
be implemented.
12
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Figure 1: The Optimal Persistence (ĥat = ĥ
b
t)
is affected by future central bank credibilities. Suppose, for the sake of the
argument, that the impact coefficient of the cost-push shock (ĥt) is equal in
both simulations. Under this assumption, the allocation in period t depends on
future central bank credibilities only because future central bank credibilites
affect the optimal persistence in the output gap.
Monetary policy commitments affect the agents’ expectations about future
output gaps. By that, they exert (positive or negative) pressure on the current
inflation rate. To see this, re-express the Phillips curve as follows:
πa0 = κE0
3∑
i=0
βixai + ut (26)
πb0 = κE0
2∑
i=0
βixbi + ut (27)
In simulation a (γ2 = 1), agents expect the central bank to honor policy
commitments in period 3 while in simulation b (γ2 = 0), agents expect a return
to the feasible (xt, πt) = (0, 0) allocation in period 3. Facing a positive cost-
push shock in t = 0, a näıve central banker may consider the same policy
commitment independent of future central bank credibilities. Is this optimal,
knowing that E0xa3 < 0 and E0xb3 = 0? More formally, is xa0 = x
b,G
0 , x
a
1 = x
b,G
1 ,
and xa2 = x
b,G
2 (where G denotes a guess) an optimal monetary policy response,
even though E0xa3 < 0 and E0xb3 = 0?
The answer is no, because optimality would require the allocation (xa0, π
a
0)
to deliver the same welfare as (xb,G0 , π
b,G
0 ). Strict convexity in the central bank
objective function suggests, however, that the two allocations do not deliver the
13
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same welfare. This is because the output gap is the same in both allocations
(xa0 = x
b,G
0 ) while the corresponding inflation rate is not (π
a
0 < π
b,G
0 ). The
(off-equilibrium) difference πa0 < π
b,G
0 is partly offset by a commitment to a
more severe recession in simulation b.
Figure 1 displays the optimal monetary policy responses for both simula-
tions under the assumption ĥat = ĥ
b
t ∀t.11 The output gap and the inflation
rate are the same in period 0 because x−1 = 0 and because ĥ0 is indepen-
dent γ2 by assumption. As of period 1, however, simulation b features a more
negative optimal output gap than simulation a. This is because in simulation
b, the central bank must optimally implement a more pronounced recession
to partly offset the shorter horizon for which it can provide a credible policy
commitment. The persistence parameter in the optimal monetary policy rule
is hence higher in simulation b (abt > a
a
t ∀t ≤ T ).
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Figure 2: The Optimal Impact Coefficient (aat = a
b
t)
Let us now analyze how future central bank credibilities affect the severity
of the policy trade-off between the output gap and the inflation rate (which
is formally captured by ĥt). To isolate this channel, suppose that at is left
unaffected by the sequence of current and future central bank credibilities.
The severity of the policy trade-off is greater, the less flexible public expec-
tations adjust to monetary policy commitments. As before, agents expect the
policy commitment to be implemented for two (three) periods in simulation a
(b). Applying the same logic as in the argument above, this implies that the
optimal xb0 must lie below x
a
0 to partly offset the shorter horizon over which
11To see any meaningful difference between simulation a and b, figure 1 and figure 2
assume an unrealistically high degree of price stickiness (θ = 0.9792). The qualitative result
is, however, not affected by the degree of price stickiness.
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the public expects the central bank to implement the policy commitments in
simulation b. Importantly, the optimal xb0 is not so low as to have π
b
t = π
a
t .
The policy trade-off is hence more pronounced in simulation b.
Figure 2 illustrates the optimal monetary policy responses for both simula-
tions under the assumption aat = a
b
t ∀t. In t = {0, 1, 2}, the inflation gap and
the output gap are both further off steady state than in simulation b.
Figure 3 summarizes the evolution of the optimal persistence and the opti-
mal impact coefficient over time for both simulations. Independent of t, both
coefficients are more favorable (that is: lower) in simulation a, compared to
simulation b. Also, both coefficients become less favorable (that is: rise) over
time because the horizon over which the central bank can provide a credible
policy commitment becomes shorter, the more time has passed.
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Figure 3: Optimal Monetary Policy Rule with ρu = 0.95
3.2 Policy Deviations vs. Honored Commitments
When is it optimal for the central bank to implement past policy commit-
ments? Proposition 1 shows that if each agent forms a correct belief about
the central bank’s credibility in period T (which is γT = 0 because the central
bank implements the discretionary solution in period T +1 with certainty) full
credibility in t < T is inconsistent with strategic policy decisions.
Proposition 1 Time-invariant full credibility (γt = 1 ∀t < T ) is inconsistent
with strategic policy deviations.
Proposition 1 can be proven directly: Time-invariant full credibility is in-
consistent with strategic policy deviations if the value function under a policy
15
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deviation is weakly greater than the value function under honored commit-
ments in at least one period.12 V h2 (u
k
2) > V
d
2 (u
k
2) is satisfied if and only if
(1− a2)2 +
κ2
ϑ
a22 < 0 (28)
where ϑ is strictly positive. Full credibility in period t < T is inconsistent
with strategic policy deviations because condition 28 cannot hold with γT = 0.
Proposition 2 establishes the pair result that zero credibility is consistent
with strategic policy deviations if each agent forms a correct belief about the
central bank’s credibility in period T .13
Proposition 2 Time-invariant zero credibility (γt = 0 ∀t ≤ T ) is consistent
with strategic policy deviations.
If the central bank cannot affect the agents’ expectations in period T (be-
cause all of them hold the correct belief γT = 0), it cannot do better than the
discretionary solution. As a consequence, agents assign a zero credibility to
any central bank commitment made in period T −1 (γT−1 = 0). This, in turn,
makes it optimal for the central bank to implement the discretionary solution
in T − 1, such that γT−2 = 0, and so on.
Taken together, proposition 1 and 2 confirm the long established result
of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983a). Their work
shows that the central bank is always tempted to deviate from past policy
commitments. This time-inconsistency problem precludes any credible policy
commitment in a model with rational and perfectly informed agents.
As a side result, proposition 3 shows that time-invariant limited credibility
is inconsistent with strategic policy deviations.
Proposition 3 Time-invariant limited credibility (γt = 0.5 ∀t < T ) is incon-
sistent with strategic policy deviations.
The logic of the proof is similar to the proof of proposition 1 but with
γt = 0.5 ∀t < T instead of γt = 1 ∀t < T .14 V h2 (uk2) > V d2 (uk2) requires
(1− a2)2 +
κ2
ϑ
a22 < 0 (29)
12Formally, if ∃ t such that V dt (ukt ) ≥ V ht (ukt ) for some k, time-invariant full credibility
(γt = 1 ∀t < T ) is inconsistent with strategic policy deviations. The full proof is provided
in the appendix, section 5.6.
13The full proof is provided in the appendix, section 5.6.
14The full proof is provided in the appendix, section 5.6.
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which cannot hold with γT = 0. Time-invariant limited credibility is hence
inconsistent with strategic policy deviations if each agent holds a correct belief
about the central bank’s credibility in period T . This result suggests that the
time-invariant limited commitment case assumed in Debortoli et al. (2014),
Debortoli and Lakdawala (2014), and Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007) is
not fully relevant under strategic policy deviations.
Are there any circumstances under which the central bank is willing to
honor past policy commitments? The answer is yes. Proposition 4 proves that
there is a threshold γ̄ for which γT ≥ γ̄ ∈ [0, 1] induces the central bank to
honor past policy commitments in t ≤ T .
Proposition 4 There exists a γ̄ ∈ [0, 1] such that time-invariant full credibil-
ity is consistent with strategic policy deviations if γT ≥ γ̄.
Proposition 4 is true if the value of honoring past policy commitments is
strictly greater than the value of a policy deviation for both t ∈ {1, 2} and for
each potential shock sequence, given that γT ≥ γ̄ ∈ [0, 1].15
In period 2, the central bank is willing to honor past policy commitment
if and only if V h2 (u
k
2) > V
d
2 (u
k
2). With {ut}Tt=0 = {H,H,H}, V h2 (uk2) > V d2 (uk2)
requires
ϑ+ κ2
ϑ
(Σ + 1)
2
a22 − 2Σ(1 + Σ)a2 +
(
Σ2 − ϑ
ϑ+ κ2
)
< 0 (30)
where Σ ≡ a1(1 − a0) is affected by aT (and hence γT ). In order to find
γ̄, guess γGT and compute ā
1 such that equation 30 holds with equality. Then,
re-arrange ā1 such that
γ̄1 =
(
ϑ+ κ2
) (
ϑ−
(
ϑ+ κ2
)
ā1
)
ϑβκ2ā1
(31)
The coefficients associated to a2 in equation 30 (in particular: Σ) depend
on the initial guess γGT . γ
G
T is hence not necessarily equal to γ̄
1 (which is found
to satisfy equation 30 with equality if Σ is formed with γGT ). Thus we have to
solve for the fixed point of γ̄ in equation 30 by continued iterations.16
15Formally, if ∃ γT ≥ γ̄ ∈ [0, 1] such that V h1 (ũ) > V d1 (ũ) and V h2 (ũ) > V d2 (ũ) for each
potential shock sequence ũ, γt = 1 ∀t < T is consistent with strategic policy deviations.
The full proof is provided in the appendix, section 5.6.
16Proceed as follows: First, compute the difference between γGT and γ̄
I (where γ̄I denotes
γ̄ after I iterations). Second, if the difference between γGT and γ̄
I is above some critical value,
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For reasonable parameterization, there is a γT ≥ γ̄ ∈ [0, 1] such that
V h2 (ũ) > V
d
2 (ũ) for each potential shock sequence ũ. Full central bank credibil-
ity is hence compatible with strategic policy deviations if a sufficient fraction of
agents (inconsistently) believes that the central bank implements past policy
commitments in period T + 1.
Somewhat less rigorously, if there is uncertainty about the exact end date of
the announced policy path, the central bank may find it beneficial to implement
policy commitment in t ≤ T . Though the lens of my model, this explains (at
least in parts) why monetary policy commitments were often implemented in
reality.
3.3 Sufficient Central Bank Credibility
What central bank credibility (γ̄) sustains honored commitments in t ≤
T? Understanding the determinants of γ̄ requires the understanding of two
mechanisms: First, the higher γT , the higher the relative cost of a policy
deviation in period T (the reason is that the central bank benefits from a
less severe policy trade-off, the higher its credibility). Second, the central
bank is more willing to deviate, the greater the (potentially: counterfactual)
inflation gap that is supposed to be implemented if past policy commitments
are honored.
Taken together, these two forces suggest that a higher inflation gap under
honored commitments (which increases the temptation to deviate) requires a
higher γ̄ (which decreases the temptation to deviate).
Figure 4 presents the difference V d2 (ũ)− V h2 (ũ), conditional on γ2 and the
realized shock sequence ũ. A positive difference means that the central bank
prefers to deviate from past policy commitments. More specifically, blueish
colors indicate values of γ2 which support γ0 = γ1 = 1. In contrast, yellowish
colors indicates values of γ2 which are too low to incentivize the implementation
of past policy commitments. The black solid line is the threshold γ̄ which
ensures honored commitments in t ≤ T .
To illustrate, for the shock sequence {H,H,H}, γ2 ≥ 0.49 suffices to ensure
the implementation of past policy commitments in t ≤ T . In contrast, for
the shock sequence {H,H,L}, γ2 ≥ 0.72 is necessary to avoid γ1 = 0. The
threshold for γ̄ hence carries information about the central bank’s temptation
to deviate from the announced policy path.
Why is it that γ̄ has to be higher for {H,H,L} than for {H,H,H}? The
reason is that the central bank commits to a conditional future deflation (in-
repeat the computation of āI (and the corresponding γ̄I) with γI−1 as an input. Repeat
until γI is sufficiently close to γ̄I and report γ̄ = γ̄I .
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Figure 4: Heatmap: Threshold γ2 to have γ0 = γ1 = 1
flation) in the presence of a (sequence of) positive (negative) cost-push shocks.
The conditional future deflation is amplified if the cost-push shock changes its
sign between the current and the future period. More specifically, after two
consecutive positive cost-push shocks, the expected inflation rate for period 2
under honored commitments is negative. A negative cost-push shock in period
2 amplifies the (conditional) commitment to a deflation, i.e. the change in the
sign of the cost-push shock between period 1 and 2 makes the inflation gap
under honored commitments greater (compared to a shock sequence in which
three consecutive positive cost-push shocks materialize). The central bank is
thus more inclined to deviate from past policy commitments if the shock se-
quence {H,H,L} materializes. Because the central bank is more tempted to
deviate under {H,H,L} than under {H,H,H} (at some constant γ2), γ̄ must
be higher under {H,H,L}.
Figure 5 displays the welfare under honored commitments for the shock
sequence {H,H,L} and the shock sequence {H,H,H}. As discussed above,
the central bank prefers {H,H,H} over {H,H,L} if it honors past policy
commitments. This suggests that the central bank faces a state dependent
temptation to deviate from past policy commitments.17 Put differently, my
model suggests that the central bank may face more or less (political) pressure
to renege on past promises depending on the state of the economy.
17This does not contradict proposition 3 which says that a time-invariant limited credi-
bility is inconsistent with strategic policy deviations. The reason is that past policy com-
mitments are never (always) honored if γT < γ̄ (γT > γ̄).
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Figure 5: Welfare Under Honored Commitments
Of course, for γ0 = γ1 = 1 to be consistent with rational expectations,
the central bank must already decide to implement past policy commitments
in period 1 with probability 1. Moreover, γ2 must be such that the central
bank is known to be willing to implement policy commitments in period 2
with certainty, i.e. even if the realized u2 is such that the temptation to renege
in period 2 is maximized. The central bank is willing to honor past policy
commitments under any realization of the shock sequence if γ2 ≥ 0.72.18
4 Concluding Remarks
The empirical motivation for this paper is the observation that central
banks have recently used more or less explicit policy commitments to manage
public expectations. Woodford (2012) and Andrade et al. (2016) argue that
these commitments are subject to potential revisions. Current and future
credibility therefore plays a crucial role in determining the effectiveness of
monetary policy commitments. In particular, if the central bank’s credibility is
high, agents are more willing to adjust their expectations. The responsiveness
18Because the agents know the first two realizations of the shock sequence in t = 1, the
consistent γ1 may depend on the state of the economy. In particular, after two consecutive,
equally signed cost-push shocks, γ1 = 0.5 is consistent with honored commitments in period
1 in some range of γT , while γ1 = 1 is consistent in the same range of γT if the sign of the
cost-push shock differs between period 0 and 1 (this is true for γT ∈ (0.49, 0.72)). Central
bank credibility in period 1 may be 0.5 because the inflation rate in period 2 under honored
commitments, and with it the temptation to deviate, differs with the first two realizations
of the cost-push shock. I constrain the attention to cases in which γ2 ≥ γ̄ implies γ1 = 1
for each potential shock sequence to avoid dealing with path dependent sequences of central
bank credibilities. γ̄ = 0.72 is hence the most conservative measure of the threshold γ̄ that
is necessary to defer policy deviations in t ≤ T .
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of the agents’ expectations feeds back into the optimal behavior of the central
bank, i.e. affects the optimal monetary policy rule.
Most papers in the recent literature on limited commitment in monetary
policy, e.g. Debortoli et al. (2014) and Bodenstein et al. (2012), make two criti-
cal assumption: First, central bank credibility is time-invariant and exogenous.
Second, policy deviations occur randomly. My paper allows for time-variation
in the central bank’s credibility and endogenizes the monetary policy decision.
It asks two questions: First, how does future central bank credibility affect
the optimal monetary policy rule? Second, under which circumstances is it
optimal for the central bank to implement past policy commitments?
To address this question, I use a simple New Keynesian dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium (DSGE) model in which the central bank decides strate-
gically if it wants to honor past policy commitments. Policy deviation come
with a permanent and complete loss of central bank credibility, i.e. higher
macroeconomic volatility in the future. The central bank decides to renege on
past policy commitments if and only if a deviation delivers a higher welfare
than the implementation of past policy commitments.
My results show that higher future expected central bank credibility atten-
uates the current period policy trade-off between a stable inflation rate and a
stable output gap. Moreover, it decreases the optimal persistence in the out-
put gap. Both is because agents are more willing to adjust their expectations
if policy commitment are expected to be honored with a higher probability
and/or over a longer horizon. The higher the future expected central bank
credibility, the lower the cost of implementing policy commitments today.
The less costly implementation of the optimal monetary policy rule under
high credibility, together with the loss of credibility after a policy deviation,
provides the central bank with a incentive to implement past policy commit-
ments. My main result shows that the central bank is willing to implement
past policy commitments if a sufficient fraction of agents is not aware of the
exact end date of the policy commitment. This finding challenges the time-
inconsistency argument against monetary policy commitments and provides
a potential explanation for the repeated implementation of monetary policy
commitments in reality.
Further research is desirable along multiple dimensions of the model. First,
the rather conservative assumption about the complete and permanent loss of
credibility after a policy deviation could be relaxed. In particular, the central
bank should, in some way, be enabled to restore its credibility after a policy
deviation. Second, the model could be generalized to study path dependent
evolutions of central bank credibilities. Third, one could introduce evolution-
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ary stable preferences to analyze whether a central bank would abstain from
policy deviations under complete information.
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5 Appendix
The appendix provides details on the derivation of the New-Keynesian dy-
namic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. Also, it contains the full
proofs the propositions presented in the main text. The non-policy equilibrium
is based on Gaĺı (2015) and Canetg (2015), the second order approximation
to the household’s utility function on Gaĺı (2015) and Woodford (2005), the
derivation of the central bank objective function under limited commitment
on Debortoli and Nunes (2010), and the model solution under limited commit-
ment on Debortoli et al. (2014) and Gaĺı (2015).
5.1 Non-Policy Equilibrium
This section derives the non-policy equilibrium of the simple New Keyne-
sian model.
Households: The (representative) household maximizes its expected dis-
counted utility subject to a sequence of dynamic budget constraints and a
No-Ponzi condition.
The intertemporal utility function is additively separable in a consumption
bundle (Ct) and leisure (1 − Nt). β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor of the
household, σ ≥ 0 the constant relative risk aversion or, equivalently, the inverse
intertemporal elasticity of substitution, and ϕ ≥ 0 the inverse of the Frisch
labor supply elasticity, i.e. the inverse wage elasticity of hours worked (Nt).
The (sequence of) dynamic budget constraints are associated to the Lagrange
multiplier(s) ηt. Pt denotes the price level, Qt the period t price of a risk-free
security Bt+1 which pays one unit in period t + 1, Wt the nominal wage, and
Dt the (aggregated) nominal firm profit. The Lagrangian is given by
L = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[(
C1−σt − 1
1− σ
− N
1+ϕ
t
1 + ϕ
)
− ηt(PtCt +QtBt+1 −WtNt −Dt −Bt)
]
(32)
The No-Ponzi condition prevents excessive debt, i.e. ensures that the
household can repay its debt in every period.19 ΛT,t ≡ βT−t UC,TUC,t is the stochas-
tic discount factor, cf. Gaĺı (2015, 56, 84).
lim
T→∞
E0
[
ΛT,0
BT
PT
]
≥ 0 (33)
19In equilibrium, bond holdings Bt are zero because all households are equal.
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The household takes prices (Pt, Qt, Wt) and nominal firm profits (Dt) as
given when solving its maximization problem. The first order conditions with
respect to Ct, Nt, and Bt+1 are
βtC−σt = β
tηt (34)
βtNϕt = β
tηt (35)
βtηt = β
t+1Etηt+1 (36)
The transversality condition is
lim
T→∞
E0
[
ΛT,0
BT
PT
]
= 0 (37)
combining the first order conditions yields
Nϕt C
σ
t =
Wt
Pt
(38)
Qt = βEt
(
Pt
Pt+1
(
Ct
Ct+1
)σ)
(39)
Equation 38 constitutes a household labor market optimum [LM], i.e. an
optimal labor supply. It shows that hours worked react positively to the real
wage Wt/Pt and more strongly to a change in the (real and nominal) wage,
the lower ϕ (the lower the inverse wage elasticity of hours worked).
Equation 39 is the Euler equation [EE]. It postulates equality between the
marginal utility of consuming an additional Qt units today and the discounted
marginal utility of consuming one additional unit tomorrow. The intuition is
as follows. The household can either consume or save an additional Qt units to-
day. If the household consumes an additional Qt units today, it gets QtC
−σ
t /Pt
utils from it. If the household saves an additional Qt units today, it has one
additional unit to consume tomorrow. Because the household is impatient,
getting C−σt+1/Pt+1 utils tomorrow is only worth βC
−σ
t+1/Pt+1 utils today. If the
marginal utilities of the two options (consuming an additional Qt units today
and saving an additional Qt units today) were not the same, the household
could increase its utility by re-allocating consumption (e.g. consume more to-
day and less tomorrow). An optimal intertemporal allocation of consumption
thus requires the marginal utilities of the two options to be equal.
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Bundler: Suppose that there is an intermediary firm (the bundler) which
bundles the intermediary consumption goods Cit into a single good Ct (out-
put). I assume ε ∈ (1,∞), i.e. some, but imperfect substitutability among
intermediary consumption goods (”a taste for variety”).20 More specifically,
I impose the Dixit-Stiglitz (Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)) aggregator, assuming a
continuum of goods on the interval [0, 1].
Ct =
(∫ 1
0
C
ε−1
ε
it di
) ε
ε−1
(40)
The (static) nominal profit maximization problem of the bundler is
max
Cit
{
Pt
(∫ 1
0
C
ε−1
ε
it di
) ε
ε−1
−
∫ 1
0
PitCitdi
}
(41)
The optimal demand for the bundler’s input good Cit is
PtC
1
ε
t C
− 1ε
it − Pit = 0 (42)
Cit =
(
Pit
Pt
)−ε
Ct (43)
i.e. a decreasing function of its price Pti and an increasing function of Pt
and Ct.
Firms: There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive firms on the
interval [0, 1], each producing a single differentiated intermediary output good
Yit with a linear technology Yit = Nit (with Nit being the labor demand of
firm i). As in Calvo (1983), in every period a firm decides on a new price
Pti of its output good with probability 1 − θ. If selected to change its price,
firm i maximizes the period t market value of current and discounted future
expected real profits over P ∗t .
21 Future profits are weighted by the probability
of seeing P ∗t in effect in that period (θ
i). As in Gaĺı (2015, 84), the optimal
price setting problem takes the following form.
20ε is the elasticity of substitution among intermediary goods. More specifically, inter-
mediary goods are perfect complements if ε→ 0 and perfect substitutes if ε→∞. ε ∈ (0, 1)
implies that an increased variety reduces utility (”distaste for variety”), cf. Tutorial Dixit
Stigliz I (Franck Portier’s lecture notes). With ε = 1, preferences are of the Cobb-Douglas
form, cf. Tutorial Dixit Stigliz II. Preferences are convex if ε ∈ (0,∞).
21cf. Gaĺı (2015, 56).
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max
P∗t
∞∑
k=0
θkEt
[
Λt,t+k
1
Pt+k
(
P ∗t Yt+k|t − Ct+k(Yt+k|t)
)]
(44)
Yt+k|t is the output of a firm that last reset its price in period t and
Ct+k(Yt+k|t) is the associated nominal cost function. Use the constant elasticity
of substitution ε ≡ −dYt+k|t
dP ∗t
P ∗t
Yt+k|t
, Ψt+k|t ≡
dCt+k(Yt+k|t)
dYt+k|t
(the nominal marginal
costs of a firm that last reset its price in period t), and the definition of the
steady state mark-up M≡ ε
ε−1 to write the firm’s first order condition as
∞∑
k=0
θkEt
[
Λt,t+k
1
Pt+k
(
Yt+k|t + P
∗
t
dYt+k|t
dP ∗t
−
dCt+k(Yt+k|t)
dYt+k|t
dYt+k|t
dP ∗t
)]
= 0 (45)
∞∑
k=0
θkEt
[
Λt,t+k
1
Pt+k
(
1 +
dYt+k|t
dP ∗t
P ∗t
Yt+k|t
−Ψt+k|t
dYt+k|t
dP ∗t
1
Yt+k|t
)
Yt+k|t
]
= 0 (46)
∞∑
k=0
θkEt
[
Λt,t+k
1
Pt+k
(
1− ε+ Ψt+k|tε
1
P ∗t
)
Yt+k|t
]
= 0 (47)
∞∑
k=0
θkEt
[
Λt,t+k
1
Pt+k
(
P ∗t −MΨt+k|t
)
Yt+k|t
]
= 0 (48)
By the definition of the log-expressions for the variables, we have that
exp(p∗t − pt+k) ≡
P ∗t
Pt+k
and exp(ψt+k|t− pt+k) ≡
Ψt+k|t
Pt+k
. Furthermore, log(M) ≡
µMC such that
∞∑
k=0
θkEt
[
Λt,t+k
(
exp(p∗t − pt+k)− exp(ψt+k|t − pt+i + µMC)
)
Yt+k|t
]
= 0 (49)
A first order Taylor expansion around a zero inflation steady state (char-
acterized by p∗t − pt+k = 0, Λt,t+k = βi, Yt+k|t = Y and, consequently,
pt+k = ψt+k|t + µ
MC , cf. table 5) yields
∞∑
k=0
(θβ)kY (exp(0)− exp(0))Et
[
(p∗t − pt+k − 0)− (ψt+k|t − pt+k + µMC − 0))
]
= 0 (50)
∞∑
k=0
(θβ)kEt
[
p∗t − ψt+k|t − µMC
]
= 0 (51)
1
1− θβ
(p∗t − µMC) =
∞∑
k=0
(θβ)kEtψt+k|t (52)
p∗t = µ
MC + (1− θβ)
∞∑
k=0
(θβ)kEtψt+k|t (53)
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Because the marginal product of labor is one, we have Ψt+k|t = Wt+k,
i.e. Ψt+k|t is independent of when the price of the intermediary good was
last changed. Hence, we can write ψt+k|t = ψt+k ≡ pt+k − µMCt+k . The above
expression for p∗t can be written recursively as
p∗t = µ
MC + (1− θβ)ψt + (1− θβ)θβ
∞∑
k=0
Et(θβ)kψt+1+k (54)
p∗t = µ
MC + (1− θβ)(pt − µt) + θβ
[
Etp∗t+1 − µMC
]
(55)
p∗t = (1− θβ)pt − (1− θβ)µ̂MCt + θβEtp∗t+1 (56)
(1− βθL−1)p∗t = (1− θβ)pt − (1− θβ)µ̂MCt (57)
with µ̂MCt = µ
MC
t − µMC . From the definition of the aggregated price level
(cf. Gaĺı (2015, 55)), it follows that
pt = θpt−1 + (1− θ)p∗t (58)
p∗t =
1
1− θ
pt −
θ
1− θ
pt−1 (59)
Combining the two equations yields
(1− βθL−1)
(
1
1− θ
pt −
θ
1− θ
pt−1
)
= (1− θβ)(pt − µ̂MCt ) (60)
pt − βθEtpt+1 − (θpt−1 − βθ2pt) = (1− θ)(1− θβ)(pt − µ̂MCt ) (61)
pt − pt−1 = β [Etpt+1 − pt]−
(1− θ)(1− θβ)
θ
µ̂MCt (62)
πt = βEtπt+1 − ξµ̂MCt (63)
with ξ ≡ (1−θ)(1−βθ)
θ
.22
Equilibrium: The following system of equations determines the non-
policy equilibrium.23
22In general, ξ ≡ (1−θ)(1−βθ)θ Θ with Θ ≡
1−α
1−α(1−ε) .
23Use −log(β) ≡ ρ and −log(Qt) ≡ it when taking the log of the Euler equation (equa-
tion 39).
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Equation Name Source
ct = Etct+1 − 1σ (it − Etπt+1 − ρ) [EE] Households: Euler equation
ϕnt = wt − pt − σct [LM] Households: Labor supply equation
yt = nt [PF] Firms: Production function
πt = βEtπt+1 − ξµ̂MCt [PK] Firms: Optimal price setting
yt = ct [MCC] Market clearing condition
Table 1: Non-Policy Equilibrium, in logs, Version I
which can be simplified to
Equation Name Description
yt = Etyt+1 − 1σ (it − Etπt+1 − ρ) [IS] New Keynesian IS-Curve
πt = βEtπt+1 − ξµ̂MCt [PK] New Keynesian Phillips Curve
(σ + ϕ)yt = wt − pt [LM,PF] Labor market equilibrium
Table 2: Non-Policy Equilibrium, in logs, Version II
Use the definition of the firm mark-up µMCt ≡ pt − ψt, ψt = wt (from
Ψt+k|t ≡
dCt+k(Yt+k|t)
dYt+k|t
and the fact that the marginal product of labor is 1) and
[LM,PF] to get
µMCt ≡ pt − ψt (64)
µMCt ≡ pt − wt (65)
µMCt ≡ pt − ((σ + ϕ)yt + pt) (66)
µMCt = −(σ + ϕ)yt (67)
Furthermore, with flexible prices, θ = 0 (cf. Gaĺı (2015, 62)) such that the
firm’s first order condition collapses to µMC = p∗t +ψt. Combined with ψt = wt
(from Ψt+k|t ≡
dCt+k(Yt+k|t)
dYt+k|t
and the fact that the marginal product of labor is
1) and using [LM,PF] yields
µMC = −(σ + ϕ)ynt (68)
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i.e. a constant natural output level (which in turn implies ynt = y in every
period). Consequently
µ̂MCt = −(σ + ϕ)(yt − ynt ) (69)
and
Equation Name Description
ỹt = Etỹt+1 − 1σ (it − Etπt+1 − ρ) [IS] New Keynesian IS-Curve
πt = βEtπt+1 + κỹt [PK] New Keynesian Phillips Curve
Table 3: Non-Policy Equilibrium, in terms of ỹt
with ỹt ≡ yt − ynt and κ ≡ ξ(σ +
ϕ+α
1−α ). Acknowledge that µ
MC = 0 defines
the efficient output level such that Etyet+1 = yet = 0. Define xt ≡ yt − yet
and ut ≡ κ(yet − ynt ) (as in Gaĺı (2015, 128)), and the non-policy equilibrium
follows.24
Equation Name Description
xt = Etxt+1 − 1σ (it − Etπt+1 − ρ) [IS] New Keynesian IS-Curve
πt = κxt + βEtπt+1 + ut [PK] New Keynesian Phillips Curve
Table 4: Non-Policy Equilibrium, in terms of xt
5.2 Steady State
This section derives the steady state of the New Keynesian model.
No. Formally Reason
1) Ct = Ct+i No driving force is growing over time
2) Pt = Pt+i By the definition of a zero inflation steady state
3) Λt,t+i = β
i Follows from 1) and 2)
4) P ∗t = Pt−1 Follows from 2) and the definition of the aggregated price level
5) Yt+i|t = Y Follows from 1) and 4), no price dispersion in steady state
6) Ψt+i|t = Ψt Follows from 1) and 4), no price dispersion in steady state
7) Pt =MΨt Follows from 3), 4), 5), 6) and the firm’s first order condition
24The cost-push shock ut must thus be related to changes in µ
MC , σ, ϕ, or κ.
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Table 5: Characteristics of the Zero Inflation Steady State
The steady state log-output level is determined by the household’s labor
market optimality condition, the market clearing condition, the production
function, and the steady state log real wage
ϕnt = wt − pt − σct (70)
ϕyt = wt − pt − σyt (71)
(σ + ϕ)yt = wt − pt (72)
y = − µ
MC
σ + ϕ
(73)
The steady state log-consumption level is determined by the market clear-
ing condition and the steady state log-output level
c = y (74)
c = − µ
MC
(σ + ϕ)
(75)
The steady state log hours worked is determined by the production function
and the steady state log-output level
n = y (76)
n = − µ
MC
(σ + ϕ)
(77)
The steady state inflation rate is determined by the definition of the zero
inflation steady state
π = 0 (78)
The steady state nominal interest rate is determined by the Euler equation
[EE], the fact that in steady state Ct = Ct+i, and the steady state inflation
rate. Use −log(Qt) ≡ it and −log(β) ≡ ρ.
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log(Qt) = log(β) (79)
i = ρ (80)
The steady state real interest rate is determined by the Fisher equation
and the steady state inflation rate
rt ≡ it − Etπt+1 (81)
r = ρ (82)
5.3 Approximating the Household’s Utility
This subsection presents the derivation of a second order approximation to
the household’s utility function. Using the approximated household’s utility
function simplifies the monetary policy problem because it expresses the wel-
fare loss in terms of the welfare relevant output gap and the inflation rate. The
derivation follows Gaĺı (2015, 85, 117, 154) and Woodford (2005, 399, 694).
A second order approximation to the household’s felicity function (”current
period utility function”) around the steady state yields
Ut − U =UCC
(
Ct − C
C
)
+ UNN
(
Nt −N
N
)
+
1
2
UCCC
2
(
Ct − C
C
)2
+
1
2
UNNN
2
(
Nt −N
N
)2 (83)
Up to a second order approximation Xt−X
X
= x̂t +
1
2
x̂2t , with x̂t ≡ xt − x ≡
log
(
Xt
X
)
. Further use σ ≡ −UCC
UC
C (the inverse intertemporal elasticity of
substitution) and ϕ ≡ UNN
UN
N (the inverse of the Frisch labor supply elasticity)
to write
Ut − U = UCC
(
ŷt +
1− σ
2
ŷ2t
)
+ UNN
(
n̂t +
1 + ϕ
2
n̂2t
)
(84)
Next, realize that aggregated employment is the sum of employment across
firms Nt =
∫ 1
0
Ntidi. Combine this with Cti = Yti (the market clearing con-
dition which holds on the firm level and in the aggregate), Cti =
(
Pti
Pt
)−ε
Ct,
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and the (strictly concave and total factor productivity augmented) production
function.25
Yti = AtN
1−α
ti (85)
Nti =
(
Yti
At
) 1
1−α
(86)
Nt =
(
Yt
At
) 1
1−α
∫ 1
0
(
Pti
Pt
)− ε1−α
di (87)
Take logs and subtract the (log) production function evaluated at the
steady state.
n̂t =
1
1− α
(ŷt − at − dt) (88)
with dt ≡ (1− α)log
∫ 1
0
(
Pti
Pt
)− ε
1−α
di.
Approximating dt consists of three steps. First, from Gaĺı (2015, 53),∫ 1
0
PitCitdi = PtCt implies an aggregated price level of
Pt ≡
(∫ 1
0
P 1−εti di
) 1
1−ε
(89)
1 =
∫ 1
0
exp((1− ε)(pti − pt))di (90)
A second order approximation to the aggregated price level equation yields
1 = 1 + 1(1− ε)p̂ti +
(1− ε)2
2
p̂2ti (91)
Ei (p̂ti) =
(ε− 1)
2
Ei
(
p̂2ti
)
(92)
with p̂ti ≡ pti − pt. Second, the expression
∫ 1
0
(
Pti
Pt
)− ε
1−α
di equals
25Using Yti = AtN
1−α
ti instead of Yti = Nti is without loss of generality since the later is
a special case of the former (with At = 1 and α = 0).
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∫ 1
0
(
Pti
Pt
)− ε1−α
di = Ei
[(
Pti
Pt
)− ε1−α]
(93)
∫ 1
0
(
Pti
Pt
)− ε1−α
di = Ei
[
exp
(
− ε
1− α
p̂ti
)]
(94)
which is, up to a second order approximation and using the insight from
before (equation 92) equal to
Ei
[
exp
(
− ε
1− α
p̂ti
)]
= Ei
[
1− ε
1− α
p̂ti +
1
2
(
ε
1− α
)2
p̂2ti
]
(95)
Ei
[
exp
(
− ε
1− α
p̂ti
)]
= 1− ε
1− α
Ei (p̂ti) +
1
2
(
ε
1− α
)2
Ei
(
p̂2ti
)
(96)
Ei
[
exp
(
− ε
1− α
p̂ti
)]
= 1 +
1
2
ε
1− α
1
Θ
Ei
(
p̂2ti
)
(97)
with Θ ≡ 1−α
1−α(1−ε) . Third, Ei (p̂
2
ti) equals, up to a second order approxima-
tion, using x = pti − pt (with f ′′(x) = 0) and x0 = pti − Ei(pti),
Ei
(
p̂2ti
)
= Ei
[
(pti − Ei (pti))2 + 2 (pti − Ei (pti)) (pt − Eipti)
]
(98)
Ei
(
p̂2ti
)
= Ei
[
(pti − Ei (pti))2
]
(99)
Ei
(
p̂2ti
)
= Vi (pti) (100)
Plugging this into the insight from before (equation 97) and taking the log
yields
log
{
Ei
[
exp
(
− ε
1− α
p̂ti
)]}
= log
{
1 +
1
2
ε
1− α
1
Θ
Vi (pti)
}
(101)
dt = (1− α)log
{
1 +
1
2
ε
1− α
1
Θ
Vi (pti)
}
(102)
which equals, up to a second order approximation, using x = 1
2
ε
1−α
1
Θ
Vi (pti)
and x0 = 0, and realizing that Vi(pti)
2 is higher than second order,
dt = (1− α)
{
1
2
ε
1− α
1
Θ
Vi (pti)
}
(103)
dt =
1
2
ε
Θ
Vi (pti) (104)
35
Strategic Deviations in Optimal Monetary Policy Fabio Canetg
Back to the approximated felicity function: Combine equation 84
and 88 with the approximation for dt (equation 104), ignoring terms of third
and higher order, and use that in an efficient steady state −UN
UC
= MPN with
MPN = (1− α) Y
N
(cf. Gaĺı (2015, 21, 23)).
Ut − U = UCC
(
ŷt +
1− σ
2
ŷ2t
)
+
UNN
1− α
(
ŷt + dt +
1 + ϕ
2(1− α)
(ŷt − at)2
)
(105)
Ut − U
UCC
= −1
2
 εΘVi (pti)−(1− σ)ŷ2t + 1 + ϕ1− α (ŷt − at)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
z
 (106)
Using ŷnt = ŷ
e
t =
1+ϕ
σ(1−α)+ϕ+αat (cf. Gaĺı (2015, 62, 155) and equation 68)
we can express z as
z =
1 + ϕ
1− α
(ŷt − at)2 − (1− σ)ŷ2t (107)
z =
(
σ +
ϕ+ α
1− α
)
ŷ2t − 2
1 + ϕ
1− α
ŷtat (108)
z =
(
σ +
ϕ+ α
1− α
)
(ŷ2t − 2ŷtŷet ) (109)
z =
(
σ +
ϕ+ α
1− α
)
(ŷt − ŷet )2 (110)
Recall that xt ≡ yt − yet (with x = y − ye) such that x̂t = ŷt − ŷet .
z =
(
σ +
ϕ+ α
1− α
)
x2t (111)
Using the above result in equation 106 yields
Ut − U
UCC
= −1
2
[
ε
Θ
Vi (pti) +
(
σ +
ϕ+ α
1− α
)
x2t
]
(112)
Let us now turn to Vi (pti). Claim: Ignoring terms of third and higher
order, Vi (pti) = θVi (pt−1,i) +
θ
1−θπ
2
t . Proof, following Woodford (2005, 399,
694): Let P̄t ≡ Ei(pti)
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P̄t − P̄t−1 = Ei
(
pti − P̄t−1
)
(113)
P̄t − P̄t−1 = θEi
(
pt−1,i − P̄t−1
)
+ (1− θ)
(
p∗t − P̄t−1
)
(114)
P̄t − P̄t−1 = (1− θ)
(
p∗t − P̄t−1
)
(115)
Similarly, using the above result
Vi (pti) = Vi
(
pti − P̄t−1
)
(116)
Vi (pti) = Ei
[(
pti − P̄t−1
)2]− [Ei (pt−1,i − P̄t−1)]2 (117)
Vi (pti) = θEi
[(
pt−1,i − P̄t−1
)2]
+ (1− θ)(p∗t − P̄t−1)2 −
(
P̄t − P̄t−1
)2
(118)
Vi (pti) = θVi (pt−1,i)−
(P̄t − P̄t−1)2
1− θ
−
(
P̄t − P̄t−1
)2
(119)
Vi (pti) = θVi (pt−1,i) +
θ
1− θ
(P̄t − P̄t−1)2 (120)
Vi (pti) = θVi (pt−1,i) +
θ
1− θ
π2t (121)
q.e.d. Use Vi (pti) ≡ ∆t and iterate the above equation backwards.
∆t = θ∆t−1 +
θ
1− θ
π2t (122)
∆t = θ
t+1∆−1 +
(
θ
1− θ
) t∑
s=0
θt−sπ2s (123)
∞∑
t=0
βt∆t =
(
θ
1− θ
) ∞∑
t=0
βt
t∑
s=0
θt−sπ2s (124)
∞∑
t=0
βt∆t =
θ
1− θ
[
π20 + βθ
(
π20 +
π21
θ
)
+ (βθ)2
(
π20 +
π21
θ
+
π22
θ2
)
+ . . .
]
(125)
∞∑
t=0
βt∆t =
θ
(1− θ)(1− βθ)
∞∑
t=0
βtπ2t (126)
Back to the approximated felicity function, i.e. equation 112. Mul-
tiplied by (−1) and the expectation operator E0, summed over each (current
and future) period, and appropriately discounted by βt
− E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
Ut − U
UCC
=
1
2
E0
[
ε
Θ
∞∑
t=0
βtVi (pti) +
(
σ +
ϕ+ α
1− α
) ∞∑
t=0
βtx2t
]
(127)
Using the insight from before (equation 126) yields the expected welfare
loss function.
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− E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
Ut − U
UCC
=
1
2
E0
[
ε
Θ
θ
(1− θ)(1− βθ)
∞∑
t=0
βtπ2t +
(
σ +
ϕ+ α
1− α
) ∞∑
t=0
βtx2t
]
(128)
− E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
Ut − U
UCC
=
1
2
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
ε
Θ
θ
(1− θ)(1− βθ)
π2t +
(
σ +
ϕ+ α
1− α
)
x2t
]
(129)
Define W ≡ −E0
∑∞
t=0 β
t Ut−U
UCC
as the sum of the discounted current and
future consumption loss equivalents as a fraction of steady state consumption
(for more details, see below). Finally, the expected welfare loss function can
be represented in two ways
W = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
1
2
((
ε
ξ
)
π2t +
(
σ +
ϕ+ α
1− α
)
x2t
)
(130)
W′ = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
1
2
(π2t + ϑx
2
t ) (131)
with ξ ≡ (1−θ)(1−βθ)
θ
Θ (as above), W = ε
ξ
W′, and ϑ = ξ
ε
(
σ + ϕ+α
1−α
)
. W′ is a
rescaled welfare loss measure computed with a normalized weight of 1 on the
inflation variability.
5.4 Objective Function Under Limited Commitment
This subsection proves that under limited commitment, minimizing the
(rescaled) welfare loss function (equation 131) of the representative household
amounts to minimizing a central bank objective function of the form as in
Debortoli et al. (2014) (cf. equation 141).26 In particular, it shows that future
period losses are discounted by β times the probability that the central bank
has not deviated from the announced policy path until that period. This is so
because the central bank cannot control the expectations about the allocation
prevailing off the path on which the agents expect commitments to be honored.
Description
W (k0) Planner’s value function
Ωt Set of possible histories of states without re-opt. up to time t
ΩtR,i Set of possible histories of states up to time t, first re-opt. in period i
xt(ω
t) Choice variables, depending on the state ωt
kt(ω
t) State variables, depending on the state ωt
u (. . . , . . .) Current period objective function
p(ωt) Probability of state ωt
β Discount factor
26The proof is based on Debortoli and Nunes (2010).
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Table 6: Deriving The Central Bank Objective Function: Notation
In our case, the planner’s value function is the minimized (rescaled) welfare
loss function of the representative household
W (k0) = min
{πt,xt}∞t=0
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
1
2
(π2t + ϑx
2
t )︸ ︷︷ ︸
(Rescaled) welfare loss function
(132)
(cf. equation 131).27 To make it comparable to Debortoli and Nunes (2010),
use their notation, i.e. let 1
2
(π2t + ϑx
2
t ) = u (xt(ω
t), kt(ω
t)) where xt(ω
t) is the
control variable depending on the history of events up to period t. (ωt) and
kt(ω
t) is the state variable.
W (k0) = min
{xt}∞t=0
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu
(
xt(ω
t), kt(ω
t)
)
(133)
The planner’s value function can be expressed as
W (k0) = min
{xt}∞t=0
E0
{ ∞∑
t=0
∑
ωt∈Ωt
βtp(ωt)u
(
xt(ω
t), kt(ω
t)
)
+
min
{xt}∞t=1
∞∑
t=1
∑
ωt∈ΩtR,1
βtp(ωt)u
(
xt(ω
t), kt(ω
t)
)
+
min
{xt}∞t=2
∞∑
t=2
∑
ωt∈ΩtR,2
βtp(ωt)u
(
xt(ω
t), kt(ω
t)
)
+ . . .
} (134)
The first line is the path on which commitments are honored in every
period. The second line captures each path starting with a deviation from the
announced policy plan in period 1. The third line captures each path starting
with a deviation from the announced policy plan in period 2, and so on. For
ωt ∈ ΩiR,i, with t ≥ i, p(ωt) = p(ωt, ωiR,i) = p(ωt|ωiR,i)p(ωiR,i).
27In Debortoli and Nunes (2010), the value function is termed ”objective function”.
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W (k0) = min
{xt}∞t=0
E0
{ ∞∑
t=0
∑
ωt∈Ωt
βtp(ωt)u
(
xt(ω
t), kt(ω
t)
)
+
∞∑
i=1
βip(ωiR,i)
 ∞∑
t=i
∑
ωt∈ΩtR,i
βt−ip(ωt|ωiR,i)u
(
xi(ω
t), ki(ω
t)
)} (135)
Define εi
(
kt(ω
t
R,i)
)
≡
∞∑
t=i
∑
ωt∈ΩtR,i
βt−ip(ωt|ωiR,i)u (xi(ωt), ki(ωt)).
The term εi
(
kt(ω
t
R,i)
)
captures each path starting with a deviation from
the announced policy plan in period i > 0. Put differently, it captures each
path on which the central bank deviates from its policy plan.
W (k0) = min
{xt(Ωt)}∞t=0
E0
{ ∞∑
t=0
βtp(ωt)u
(
xt(ω
t), kt(ω
t)
)
+
∞∑
i=1
βip(ωiR,i)εi
(
kt(ω
t
R,i)
)} (136)
Let the degree of commitment be time-invariant. Then p(ωt) = γt and
p(ωiR,i) = γ
i−1(1− γ).
W (k0) = min
{xt(Ωt)}∞t=0
E0
{ ∞∑
t=0
(βγ)tu
(
xt(ω
t), kt(ω
t)
)
+
β(1− γ)ε1
(
k1(ω
t
R,1)
)
+ β2γ(1− γ)ε2
(
k2(ω
t
R,2)
)
+
β3γ2(1− γ)ε3
(
k3(ω
t
R,3)
)
+ . . .
} (137)
which is equal to
W (k0) = min
{xt(Ωt)}∞t=0
E0
{ ∞∑
t=0
(βγ)t
[
u
(
xt(ω
t), kt(ω
t)
)
+ β(1− γ)εt+1
]}
(138)
Expectations about allocations prevailing off the path on which the agents
expect commitments to be honored, i.e.
∞∑
t=0
E0εt+1, are exogenous to the central
bank’s optimization problem. Hence
40
Strategic Deviations in Optimal Monetary Policy Fabio Canetg
W (k0) = min
{xt}∞t=0
E0
{ ∞∑
t=0
(βγ)tu
(
xt(ω
t), kt(ω
t)
)
+ t.i.p.
}
(139)
W (k0) = min
{πt,xt}∞t=0
E0
{ ∞∑
t=0
(βγ)t
1
2
(π2t + ϑx
2
t ) + t.i.p.
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
The central bank objective function
as in Debortoli et al. (2014)
(140)
where t.i.p denotes terms independent of policy. In sum, we proved that
minimizing the (rescaled) welfare loss function (equation 131) of the represen-
tative household amounts to minimizing a central bank objective function of
the form as in Debortoli et al. (2014) (cf. equation 141).
5.5 Model Solution
This subsection derives the optimality condition of the optimal monetary
policy problem under time-varying limited commitment. The derivation is
based on the work of Debortoli et al. (2014), Gaĺı (2015), and Woodford (2005).
The central bank problem is to minimize the (rescaled) welfare loss function
over {πt, xt}∞t=0
min
{πt,xt}∞t=0
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
t−1∏
i=0
γi
1
2
(π2t + ϑx
2
t ) (141)
where γt denotes the central bank’s credibility in period t and
∏−1
i=0 γi = 1.
28
The policy problem is subject to the New Keynesian Phillips curve
πt = κxt + βγtEtπt+1 + β(1− γt)Etπdt+1 + ut (142)
where Etπt+1 is the inflation rate that is expected to prevail if commitments
are honored in period t+ 1 and Etπdt+1 is the inflation rate that is expected to
prevail if the central bank deviates from the announced policy path in period
t+ 1.
Let us express the optimization problem as a Lagrangian ”subject to the
constraint that [the optimal evolution of both choice variables from t = 0 on-
ward] represents a possible rational expectation equilibrium” (Woodford (2005,
28It is γ0 that is associated to (x1, π1) rather than γ1 because the probability with which
the agents expect the period 0 commitment to be implemented in period 1 is governed by
the central bank’s credibility in period 0. In other words, γt has to be interpreted as the
probability of seeing future policy being implemented as promised (cf. Gaĺı (2015, 129)).
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488)). Assume that the inflation rate which is expected to prevail if the central
bank reneges on past policy commitment in t+ 1 is an arbitrary (linear) func-
tion of the state variable(s) in t + 1. Formally, assume Etπdt+1 = Etft+1(ut+1)
with the (time-varying) functional form of ft+1 unknown.
L =E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
t−1∏
i=0
γi
{
1
2
(π2t + ϑx
2
t ) + λt
(
πt − κxt
− βγtπt+1 + β(1− γt)πdt+1 − ut
)} (143)
L =E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
t−1∏
i=0
γi
{
1
2
(π2t + ϑx
2
t ) + λt
(
πt − κxt
− βγtπt+1 + β(1− γt)ft+1(ut+1)− ut
)} (144)
with λt being the Lagrange multiplier associated to the New Keynesian
Phillips curve in period t. The first order condition (FOC) with respect to πt,
for each t and every potential state of the world is
βt
t−1∏
i=0
γi(πt + λt)− βt−1
t−2∏
i=0
γiλt−1βγt−1 = 0 (145)
πt = λt−1 − λt (146)
if γi > 0 ∀i ∈ {0, . . . , t− 1}. The first order condition (FOC) with respect
to xt, for each t and every potential state of the world is
βt
t−1∏
i=0
γi(ϑxt − λtκ) = 0 (147)
λt =
ϑ
κ
xt (148)
Combine
πt =
ϑ
κ
xt−1 − xt (149)
xt = xt−1 −
κ
ϑ
πt (150)
iterate
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xt = −
κ
ϑ
[πt + πt−1 + . . .+ π0] + x−1 (151)
xt = −
κ
ϑ
[πt + πt−1 + . . .+ π0 − λ−1] (152)
xt = −
κ
ϑ
[p̂t − λ−1] (153)
where p̂t ≡ πt + p̂t−1 and p̂−1 = 0 as in Gaĺı (2015, 135) if γi > 0 ∀i ∈
{0, . . . , t− 1}.29 By construction, deviations from the announced policy path
in period t imply λt−1 = 0, as in Debortoli et al. (2014).
30 31 Consequently,
with t = 0 being the initial period of the policy plan
xt = −
κ
ϑ
p̂t (154)
where p̂t = πt + p̂−1 and p̂t−1 = 0. For t > 0, the optimal output gap
depends not only on the current inflation rate but also on lagged inflation
rates. That is, there is a history dependence in the optimal output gap.
This finding previews the result that under (limited) commitment it is
both possible and optimal to commit to future policy responses when facing a
current period cost-push shock. The reason is that such a commitment affects
the household’s expectations which in turn affect current period variables (in
particular, the inflation rate). Consequently, less of a current period variability
in the output gap is necessary to achieve the optimal inflation rate. This is
beneficial because the welfare loss function is strictly convex in the inflation
rate and the output gap.32
As an intermediary step, re-express the New Keynesian Phillips curve in
terms of p̂t. Use the definition of p̂t, and replace xt with the (combined) first
order condition of the optimal monetary policy problem (equation 154).
29With γ0 = 0, the central bank’s first order condition is xt = −κϑπt as in Gaĺı (2015,
130). With γi = 0 for i > 0, equation 12 applies ∀t = {0, . . . , i− 1}.
30Suppose λ−1 = 0. Then, from equation 146 and 148 it follows that x0 = −κϑπ0 which
is the the optimality condition for the period in which the policy plan is first implemented
(cf. Gaĺı (2015, 130, 135)). In other words, setting the non-physical λ−1 = 0 is akin to a
deviation from the announced policy path in period 0.
31In the period of the policy implementation (t = 0), the ratio between the inflation rate
and the output gap is independent of central bank credibilities. However, the level of the
inflation rate and the output gap changes with {γt}Tt=0 (cf. equation 173).
32A more detailed discussion is provided in Gaĺı (2015, 137).
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πt = κxt + βγtEtπt+1 + β(1− γt)Etπdt+1 + ut (155)
p̂t − p̂t−1 = κxt + βγt (Etp̂t+1 − p̂t) + β(1− γt)
(
Etp̂dt+1 − p̂t
)
+ ut (156)(
ϑ(1 + β) + κ2
ϑ
)
p̂t = p̂t−1 + βγtEtp̂t+1 + β(1− γt)Etp̂dt+1 + ut (157)
Realize that, by definition, Etp̂dt+1 = Etπdt+1 + p̂t.
(
ϑ(1 + βγt) + κ
2
ϑ
)
p̂t = p̂t−1 + βγtEtp̂t+1 + β(1− γt)Etπdt+1 + ut (158)
p̂t = µt
[
p̂t−1 + βγtEtp̂t+1 + β(1− γt)Etπdt+1 + ut
]
(159)
where µt ≡ ϑϑ(1+βγt)+κ2 . Let ut ∼ AR(1) with E(ε
u
t ) = 0 and V (ε
u
t ) = σ
2
εut
.
ut = ρuut−1 + ε
u
t (160)
Apply the method of undetermined coefficients and guess the time-varying
solution for p̂t to be
p̂t = atp̂t−1 + ctut (161)
Further guess the time-varying (linear) solution πdt = ĥtut with ĥt unknown.
Plug the two guesses into the re-expressed Phillips curve (equation 159).33
p̂t = µt
[
p̂t−1 + βγt [at+1p̂t + ct+1ρuut] + β(1− γt)ĥt+1ρuut + ut
]
(162)
p̂t =
µt
1− µtβγtat+1
[
p̂t−1 + (1 + βγtct+1ρu + β(1− γt)ĥt+1ρu)ut
]
(163)
Solve recursively for at ∈ (0, 1).
at =
µt
1− µtβγtat+1
(164)
33γt is not a random variable.
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Realize that a deviation from the announced policy path in t requires p̂t−1 =
0 (cf. equation 154). From the guess for p̂t (equation 161) we get
p̂dt = atp̂t−1 + ctut (165)
p̂dt = ctut (166)
Furthermore, by definition,
p̂dt = π
d
t + p̂t−1 (167)
p̂dt = π
d
t (168)
Because I assume πdt = ĥtut it must be that ĥt = ct ∀t. Solve recursively
for ct, t ∈ {0, . . . , T}, using {aj}T+1t=0 from above.
ct =
µt(1 + βγtct+1ρu + β(1− γt)ĥt+1ρu)
1− µtβγtat+1
(169)
ct =
µt(1 + βct+1ρu)
1− µtβγtat+1
(170)
and cT+i =
ϑ
κ2+ϑ(1−βρu) ∀i ≥ 1 as in Gaĺı (2015, 130).
The optimality condition (equation 154), together with the guess for p̂t
(equation 161) and the solution for the coefficients (in particular, ct = ĥt)
yields the time-varying model solution.
p̂t = atp̂t−1 + ctut (171)
xt = atxt−1 −
ctκ
ϑ
ut (172)
xt = atxt−1 −
ĥtκ
ϑ
ut (173)
where µt ≡ ϑϑ(1+βγt)+κ2 ∀t, at =
µt
1−µtβγtat+1 ∀t, ĥt =
µt(1+βĥt+1ρu)
1−µtβγtat+1 ∀t ∈
{0, . . . , T}, and ĥT+i = ϑκ2+ϑ(1−βρu) ∀i ≥ 1.
5.6 Proofs
Suppose t = {0, 1, 2, 3} with T = 2 and assume x−1 = 0. From the model
solution (equation 173) and the combined first order condition of the central
bank (equation 150) it follows that
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xt,h = atxt−1 −
ĥtκ
ϑ
ut (174)
πt,h = ĥtut +
ϑ
κ
(1− at)xt−1 (175)
if past policy commitments are honored (which is indicated by the subscript
h). In terms of ũ = {ut}T+1t=0 , the optimal {xt,h}2t=0 are
x0,h = −
κ
ϑ
ĥ0u0 (176)
x1,h = −
κ
ϑ
[
ĥ1u1 + a1ĥ0u0
]
(177)
x2,h = −
κ
ϑ
[
ĥ2u2 + a2ĥ1u1 + a2a1ĥ0u0
]
(178)
In terms of ũ, the optimal {πt,h}2t=0 are
π0,h = ĥ0u0 (179)
π1,h = ĥ1u1 − (1− a1)ĥ0u0 (180)
π2,h = ĥ2u2 − (1− a2)
[
ĥ1u1 + a1ĥ0u0
]
(181)
As in Debortoli et al. (2014), policy deviations in period s are associated
to xs−1 = 0. Moreover, policy deviations are accompanied by a complete and
permanent loss of central bank credibility, i.e. γt = 0 ∀t ∈ {s, ..., 3}. In other
words, if the central bank deviates from past policy commitment in period
s, the optimal xt,d and πt,d are, for t = {s, ..., 3}, equal to the discretionary
solution (policy deviations are indicated by the subscript d).34
xt,d = −
ĥtκ
ϑ
ut (182)
πt,d = ĥtut (183)
In period 3, the central bank implements the discretionary solution with
certainty.35 This implies a3 =
ϑ
ϑ+κ2
. Using equation 164, a2 is given by
34Note that γt = 0 does not per se imply that the central bank behaves discretionary in
period t. In equilibrium, however, γt−1 = 0 always implies a policy deviation in period t.
The proof is provided below.
35The only consistent central bank credibility in T is therefore γT = 0.
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a2 =
µ2
1− µ2βγ2a3
(184)
a2 =
ϑ
ϑ(1+βγ2)+κ2
1− ϑβγ2ϑ(1+βγ2)+κ2
ϑ
ϑ+κ2
(185)
a2 =
ϑ
(
ϑ+ κ2
)
[ϑ(1 + βγ2) + κ2] (ϑ+ κ2)− ϑ2βγ2
(186)
Because ∂a2
∂γ2
< 0, a2 is maximized at γ2 = 0 and minimized at γ2 = 1.
a2 =
ϑ
(
ϑ+ κ2
)
(ϑ+ κ2)
2
+ ϑβκ2γ2
(187)
min
γ2
a2 =
ϑ
(
ϑ+ κ2
)
(ϑ+ κ2)
2
+ ϑβκ2
> 0 (188)
max
γ2
a2 =
ϑ
(ϑ+ κ2)
< 1 (189)
i.e. a2 ∈ (0, 1). Again, resorting to equation 164, a1 is given by
a1 =
µ1
1− µ1βγ1a2
(190)
a1 =
ϑ
ϑ(1+βγ1)+κ2
1− ϑβγ2ϑ(1+βγ2)+κ2
ϑ(ϑ+κ2)
[ϑ(1+βγ2)+κ2](ϑ+κ2)−ϑ2βγ2
(191)
a1 =
ϑ
{[
ϑ(1 + βγ2) + κ
2
] (
ϑ+ κ2
)
− ϑ2βγ2
}
{[ϑ(1 + βγ2) + κ2] (ϑ+ κ2)− ϑ2βγ2} (ϑ(1 + βγ1) + κ2)− ϑ2βγ1(ϑ+ κ2)
(192)
a1 =
ϑ
{[
ϑ(1 + βγ2) + κ
2
] (
ϑ+ κ2
)
− ϑ2βγ2
}
(ϑ+ κ2) [(ϑ(1 + βγ2) + κ2) (ϑ(1 + βγ1) + κ2)− ϑ2β(γ2 + γ1)]− ϑ3β2γ2γ1
(193)
Because µ1 ∈ (0, 1) and µ1βγ1a2 ∈ (0, 1), equation 190 implies a1 ∈ (0, 1).
For the sake of tractability, a0 is expressed as
a0 =
µ0
1− µ0βγ0a1
(194)
a0 =
ϑ
ϑ(1+βγ0)+κ2
1− ϑβγ0ϑ(1+βγ0)+κ2
(195)
a0 =
ϑ
[ϑ(1 + βγ0) + κ2]− ϑβγ0a1
(196)
where a0 ∈ (0, 1) because µ0 ∈ (0, 1) and µ0βγ0a1 ∈ (0, 1),. Finally, ĥt =
at ∀t ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} if ρu = 0.
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Claim: Time-invariant limited credibility is inconsistent with strategic
policy deviations if γT = 0. Proof: Suppose γT = 0, γt = 0.5 ∀t < T ,
V h1 (u
j
1) > V
d
1 (u
j
1) for exactly one j, and V
h
2 (u
k
2) > V
d
2 (u
k
2) for exactly one k.
Logic of the proof: By contradiction: If V d1 (u
j
1) ≥ V h1 (u
j
1) ∀j or V d2 (uk2) ≥
V h2 (u
k
2) ∀k it is proven that γt = 0.5 ∀t < T is inconsistent with strategic
policy deviations.
Realize that V i3 (u3) = 0 such that V
i
2 (u
k
2) = U
i
2(u
k
2). V
h
2 (u
k
2) > V
d
2 (u
k
2) is
satisfied if and only if
− 1
2
[(
ĥ2u
k
2 − (1− a2)
(
ĥ1u
j
1 + a1ĥ0u0
))2
+
κ2
ϑ
(
ĥ2u
k
2 + a2
(
ĥ1u
j
1 + a1ĥ0u0
))2 ]
> −1
2
ĥ22,d
(
(uk2)
2 +
κ2
ϑ
(uk2)
2
)
(197)
− 1
2
[(
ĥ22(u
k
2)
2 +
(
(1− a2)
(
ĥ1u
j
1 + a1ĥ0u0
))2
− 2ĥ2(1− a2)uk2
(
ĥ1u
j
1 + a1ĥ0u0
))
+
κ2
ϑ
(
ĥ22(u
k
2)
2 +
(
a2
(
ĥ1u
j
1 + a1ĥ0u0
))2
+ 2ĥ2a2u
k
2
(
ĥ1u
j
1 + a1ĥ0u0
))]
> −1
2
ĥ22,d
(
(uk2)
2 +
κ2
ϑ
(uk2)
2
)
(198)
(1− a2)2
(
ĥ1u
j
1 + a1ĥ0u0
)2
− 2ĥ2(1− a2)uk2
(
ĥ1u
j
1 + a1ĥ0u0
)
+
κ2
ϑ
(
a22
(
ĥ1u
j
1 + a1ĥ0u0
)2
+ 2ĥ2a2u
k
2
(
ĥ1u
j
1 + a1ĥ0u0
))
<
(
ĥ22,d − ĥ22
)(
(uk2)
2 +
κ2
ϑ
(uk2)
2
) (199)
(
(1− a2)2 +
κ2
ϑ
a22
)(
ĥ1u
j
1 + a1ĥ0u0
)2
− 2
(
(1− a2)−
κ2
ϑ
a2
)
ĥ2u
k
2
(
ĥ1u
j
1 + a1ĥ0u0
)
<
(
ĥ22,d − ĥ22
)(
(uk2)
2 +
κ2
ϑ
(uk2)
2
) (200)
Following Gaĺı (2015, 130), ĥ2,d = ĥ3,d =
ϑ
κ2+ϑ(1−βρu) is the impact coeffi-
cient under a policy deviation. Using equation 170 and ĥt = ct ∀t ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3},
ĥ2 (the impact coefficient under honored commitments) is given by
ĥ2(γ2 = 0) = µ2(1 + βĥ3,dρu) (201)
ĥ2(γ2 = 0) =
ϑ
ϑ+ κ2
(
1 +
βρuϑ
κ2 + ϑ(1− βρu)
)
(202)
ĥ2(γ2 = 0) =
ϑ
κ2 + ϑ(1− βρu)
(203)
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Finally, remember that γ2 = 0 implies (1 − a2) − κ
2
ϑ
a2 = 0. In sum,
V h2 (u
k
2) > V
d
2 (u
k
2) is satisfied if and only if
(1− a2)2 +
κ2
ϑ
a22 < 0 (204)
Because ϑ > 0, the condition for V h2 (u
k
2) > V
d
2 (u
k
2) is never satisfied. This
suggests γ1 = 0, contradicting what was supposed to be true (namely that
γt = 0.5 ∀t < T is consistent with strategic policy deviations). Consequently,
we have shown that time-invariant limited credibility in period t < T is incon-
sistent with strategic policy deviations if γT = 0.
Claim: Time-invariant full credibility is inconsistent with strategic policy
deviations if γT = 0. Proof: Suppose γT = 0, γt = 1 ∀t < T , V h1 (u
j
1) >
V d1 (u
j
1) ∀j, and V h2 (uk2) > V d2 (uk2) ∀k. Logic of the proof: By contradiction:
If V d1 (u
j
1) ≥ V h1 (u
j
1) for some j or V
d
2 (u
k
2) ≥ V h2 (uk2) for some k it is proven that
γt = 1 ∀t < T is inconsistent with strategic policy deviations.
Realize that V i3 (u3) = 0 such that V
i
2 (u
k
2) = U
i
2(u
k
2). V
h
2 (u
k
2) > V
d
2 (u
k
2) is
satisfied if and only if
− 1
2
[(
ĥ2u
k
2 − (1− a2)
(
ĥ1u
j
1 + a1ĥ0u0
))2
+
κ2
ϑ
(
ĥ2u
k
2 + a2
(
ĥ1u
j
1 + a1ĥ0u0
))2 ]
> −1
2
ĥ22,d
(
(uk2)
2 +
κ2
ϑ
(uk2)
2
)
(205)
− 1
2
[(
ĥ22(u
k
2)
2 +
(
(1− a2)
(
ĥ1u
j
1 + a1ĥ0u0
))2
− 2ĥ2(1− a2)uk2
(
ĥ1u
j
1 + a1ĥ0u0
))
+
κ2
ϑ
(
ĥ22(u
k
2)
2 +
(
a2
(
ĥ1u
j
1 + a1ĥ0u0
))2
+ 2ĥ2a2u
k
2
(
ĥ1u
j
1 + a1ĥ0u0
))]
> −1
2
ĥ22,d
(
(uk2)
2 +
κ2
ϑ
(uk2)
2
)
(206)
(1− a2)2
(
ĥ1u
j
1 + a1ĥ0u0
)2
− 2ĥ2(1− a2)uk2
(
ĥ1u
j
1 + a1ĥ0u0
)
+
κ2
ϑ
(
a22
(
ĥ1u
j
1 + a1ĥ0u0
)2
+ 2ĥ2a2u
k
2
(
ĥ1u
j
1 + a1ĥ0u0
))
<
(
ĥ22,d − ĥ22
)(
(uk2)
2 +
κ2
ϑ
(uk2)
2
) (207)
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(
(1− a2)2 +
κ2
ϑ
a22
)(
ĥ1u
j
1 + a1ĥ0u0
)2
− 2
(
(1− a2)−
κ2
ϑ
a2
)
ĥ2u
k
2
(
ĥ1u
j
1 + a1ĥ0u0
)
<
(
ĥ22,d − ĥ22
)(
(uk2)
2 +
κ2
ϑ
(uk2)
2
) (208)
Following Gaĺı (2015, 130), ĥ2,d = ĥ3,d =
ϑ
κ2+ϑ(1−βρu) is the impact coeffi-
cient under a policy deviation. Using equation 170 and ĥt = ct ∀t ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3},
ĥ2 (the impact coefficient under honored commitments) is given by
ĥ2(γ2 = 0) = µ2(1 + βĥ3,dρu) (209)
ĥ2(γ2 = 0) =
ϑ
ϑ+ κ2
(
1 +
βρuϑ
κ2 + ϑ(1− βρu)
)
(210)
ĥ2(γ2 = 0) =
ϑ
κ2 + ϑ(1− βρu)
(211)
Finally, remember that γ2 = 0 implies (1 − a2) − κ
2
ϑ
a2 = 0. In sum,
V h2 (u
k
2) > V
d
2 (u
k
2) is satisfied if and only if
(1− a2)2 +
κ2
ϑ
a22 < 0 (212)
Because ϑ > 0, the condition for V h2 (u
k
2) > V
d
2 (u
k
2) is never satisfied. This
suggests γ1 = 0, contradicting what was supposed to be true (namely that
γt = 1 ∀t < T is consistent with strategic policy deviations). Consequently,
we have shown that full credibility in period t < T is inconsistent with strategic
policy deviations if γT = 0.
Claim: Time-invariant zero credibility is consistent with strategic policy
deviations. Proof: Suppose γt = 0 ∀t ≤ T . Then V h1 (u
j
1) ≤ V d1 (u
j
1) ∀j
and V h2 (u
k
2) ≤ V d2 (uk2) ∀k. Logic of the proof: Direct proof: If V h1 (u
j
1) ≤
V d1 (u
j
1) ∀j and V h2 (uk2) ≤ V d2 (uk2) ∀k it is proven that γt = 0 ∀t ≤ T is consis-
tent with strategic policy deviations.
Realize that V i3 (u3) = 0 such that V
i
2 (u
k
2) = U
i
2(u
k
2). V
h
2 (u
k
2) ≤ V d2 (uk2) is
satisfied if and only if
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(
(1− a2)2 +
κ2
ϑ
a22
)(
ĥ1u
j
1 + a1ĥ0u0
)2
− 2
(
(1− a2)−
κ2
ϑ
a2
)
ĥ2u
k
2
(
ĥ1u
j
1 + a1ĥ0u0
)
≥
(
ĥ22,d − ĥ22
)(
(uk2)
2 +
κ2
ϑ
(uk2)
2
) (213)
From the previous proof, ĥ2,d = ĥ2(γ2 = 0). Moreover, γ2 = 0 implies
(1− a2)− κ
2
ϑ
a2 = 0. In sum, V
h
2 (u
k
2) ≤ V d2 (uk2) is satisfied if and only if
(1− a2)2 +
κ2
ϑ
a22 ≥ 0 (214)
Because ϑ > 0, the condition for V h2 (u
k
2) ≤ V d2 (uk2) ∀k is satisfied. This
finding confirms what was supposed to be true (namely γ1 = 0 is consistent
with strategic policy deviations). What is left to prove is V h1 (u
j
1) ≤ V d1 (uk1) ∀j
if the central bank credibility in period 1 is γ1 = 0.
V h1 (u
j
1) ≤ V d1 (u
j
1) (215)
Uh1 (u
j
1) + βp
(
V d2 (u
k
2) + V
d
2 (u
k̄
2)
)
≤ Ud1 (u
j
1) + βp
(
V d2 (u
k
2) + V
d
2 (u
k̄
2)
)
(216)
Uh1 (u
j
1) ≤ Ud1 (u
j
1) (217)
more explicitly
− 1
2
[(
ĥ1u
j
1 − (1− a1)ĥ0u0
)2
+
κ2
ϑ
(ĥ1u
j
1 + a1ĥ0u0)
2
]
≤ −1
2
ĥ21,d
(
(uj1)
2 +
κ2
ϑ
(uj1)
2
)
(218)
Make use of the fact that γt = 0 ∀t ≤ T implies ĥ0 = ĥ1 = ĥ1,d.
(1− a1)2u20 − 2(1− a1)u
j
1u0 +
κ2
ϑ
(
a21u
2
0 + 2a1u
j
1u0
)
≥ 0 (219)(
(1− a1)2 +
κ2
ϑ
a21
)
u20 − 2
(
(1− a1)−
κ2
ϑ
a1
)
uj1u0 ≥ 0 (220)
Remember that γ1 = 0 implies (1 − a1) − κ
2
ϑ
a1 = 0. As a consequence,
V h1 (u
j
1) ≤ V d1 (u
j
1) is satisfied if and only if
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(1− a1)2 +
κ2
ϑ
a1 ≥ 0 (221)
Because ϑ > 0, the condition for V h1 (u
j
1) ≤ V d1 (u
j
1) ∀j is satisfied. This
finding confirms what was supposed to be true (namely γt = 0 ∀t ≤ T is
consistent with strategic policy deviations).
Claim: There exists a γ̄ ∈ [0, 1] such that time-invariant full credibility is
consistent with strategic policy deviations if γT ≥ γ̄ (assuming that ρu = 0).36
37 Proof: Suppose γT > 0, γt = 1 ∀t < T and ρu = 0. Then V h1 (ũ) > V d1 (ũ)
and V h2 (ũ) > V
d
2 (ũ) for each potential shock sequence ũ if γT ≥ γ̄ ∈ [0, 1].
Logic of the proof: Direct proof: If ∃ γT ≥ γ̄ ∈ [0, 1] such that V h1 (ũ) >
V d1 (ũ) and V
h
2 (ũ) > V
d
2 (ũ) for each ũ, it is proven that γt = 1 ∀t < T is
consistent with strategic policy deviations if γ̄ ≤ γT and ρu = 0.
Realize that V i3 (u3) = 0 such that V
i
2 (u
k
2) = U
i
2(u
k
2). V
h
2 (u
k
2) > V
d
2 (u
k
2) is
satisfied if and only if
− 1
2
[(
ĥ2u
k
2 − (1− a2)
(
ĥ1u
j
1 + a1ĥ0u0
))2
+
κ2
ϑ
(
ĥ2u
k
2 + a2
(
ĥ1u
j
1 + a1ĥ0u0
))2 ]
> −1
2
ĥ22,d
(
(uk2)
2 +
κ2
ϑ
(uk2)
2
)
(222)
− 1
2
[(
ĥ22(u
k
2)
2 +
(
(1− a2)
(
ĥ1u
j
1 + a1ĥ0u0
))2
− 2ĥ2(1− a2)uk2
(
ĥ1u
j
1 + a1ĥ0u0
))
+
κ2
ϑ
(
ĥ22(u
k
2)
2 +
(
a2
(
ĥ1u
j
1 + a1ĥ0u0
))2
+ 2ĥ2a2u
k
2
(
ĥ1u
j
1 + a1ĥ0u0
))]
> −1
2
ĥ22,d
(
(uk2)
2 +
κ2
ϑ
(uk2)
2
)
(223)
(1− a2)2
(
ĥ1u
j
1 + a1ĥ0u0
)2
− 2ĥ2(1− a2)uk2
(
ĥ1u
j
1 + a1ĥ0u0
)
+
κ2
ϑ
(
a22
(
ĥ1u
j
1 + a1ĥ0u0
)2
+ 2ĥ2a2u
k
2
(
ĥ1u
j
1 + a1ĥ0u0
))
<
(
ĥ22,d − ĥ22
)(
(uk2)
2 +
κ2
ϑ
(uk2)
2
) (224)
36γT > 0 is assumed rather than derived from a consistency requirement. Consistency
would require γT = 0 because in period T +1, the central bank implements the discretionary
solution with certainty.
37ρu = 0 is assumed for simplicity.
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(
(1− a2)2 +
κ2
ϑ
a22
)(
ĥ1u
j
1 + a1ĥ0u0
)2
− 2
(
(1− a2)−
κ2
ϑ
a2
)
ĥ2u
k
2
(
ĥ1u
j
1 + a1ĥ0u0
)
<
(
ĥ22,d − ĥ22
)(
(uk2)
2 +
κ2
ϑ
(uk2)
2
) (225)
Let {ut}Tt=0 = {H,H,H} and remember that with ρu = 0, ht = at and
ht,d = at,d ∀t ≤ T .38
(
(1− a2)2 +
κ2
ϑ
a22
)(
ĥ1 + a1ĥ0
)2
− 2
(
(1− a2)−
κ2
ϑ
a2
)
ĥ2
(
ĥ1 + a1ĥ0
)
<
(
ĥ22,d − ĥ22
)(
1 +
κ2
ϑ
) (226)
(
(1− a2)2 +
κ2
ϑ
a22
)
a21 (1 + a0)
2 − 2
(
(1− a2)−
κ2
ϑ
a2
)
a2a1 (1 + a0)
<
(
a22,d − a22
)(ϑ+ κ2
ϑ
) (227)
Let Σ ≡ a1(1− a0) where
a1 =
ϑ
{[
ϑ(1 + βγ2) + κ
2
] (
ϑ+ κ2
)
− ϑ2βγ2
}
(ϑ+ κ2) [(ϑ(1 + βγ2) + κ2) (ϑ(1 + βγ1) + κ2)− ϑ2β(γ2 + γ1)]− ϑ3β2γ2γ1
(228)
a0 =
ϑ
[ϑ(1 + βγ0) + κ2]− ϑβγ0a1
(229)
from equation 193 and 196. Remember that a2,d =
ϑ
ϑ+κ2
because γt = 0 if
the central bank deviates from past policy commitments in t.
(
(1− a2)2 +
κ2
ϑ
a22
)
Σ2 − 2
(
(1− a2)−
κ2
ϑ
a2
)
a2Σ <
(
a22,d − a22
)(ϑ+ κ2
ϑ
)
(230)(
1− 2a2 + a22 +
κ2
ϑ
a22
)
Σ2 − 2a2Σ + 2a22Σ + 2
κ2
ϑ
a22Σ + a
2
2
ϑ+ κ2
ϑ
<
ϑ
ϑ+ κ2
(231)
Σ2 − 2a2Σ(1 + Σ) + a22
(
Σ2 +
κ2
ϑ
Σ2 + 2Σ + 2
κ2
ϑ
Σ +
ϑ+ κ2
ϑ
)
<
ϑ
ϑ+ κ2
(232)
Σ2 − 2a2Σ(1 + Σ) + a22
ϑ+ κ2
ϑ
(
Σ2 + 2Σ + 1
)
<
ϑ
ϑ+ κ2
(233)
ϑ+ κ2
ϑ
(Σ + 1)
2
a22 − 2Σ(1 + Σ)a2 +
(
Σ2 − ϑ
ϑ+ κ2
)
< 0 (234)
38The proof is similar for other shock sequences. Specifics are provided below.
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For {ut}Tt=0 = {H,H,L}, {ut}Tt=0 = {H,L,H}, and {ut}Tt=0 = {H,L, L}
the conditions are given by
ϑ+ κ2
ϑ
(Σ− 1)2 a22 + 2Σ(1− Σ)a2 +
(
Σ2 − ϑ
ϑ+ κ2
)
> 0 (235)
ϑ+ κ2
ϑ
(Σ− 1)2 a22 + 2Σ(1− Σ)a2 +
(
Σ2 − ϑ
ϑ+ κ2
)
< 0 (236)
ϑ+ κ2
ϑ
(Σ + 1)
2
a22 − 2Σ(1 + Σ)a2 +
(
Σ2 − ϑ
ϑ+ κ2
)
> 0 (237)
respectively. Let φ1 ≡ ϑ+κ
2
ϑ
(Σ + 1)2, φ2 ≡ 2Σ(1+Σ) and φ3 ≡
(
Σ2 − ϑ
ϑ+κ2
)
depend on the initial guess γGT . The threshold for a2 (i.e. the ā which satisfies
equation 234 with equality, given γGT ) is
ā1 =
−φ2 ±
√
φ22 − 4φ1φ3
2φ1
(238)
Because ∂a2
∂γ2
< 0 and because the condition for V h2 (u
k
2) > V
d
2 (u
k
2) is satisfied
if and only if a2 < ā, there must be a associated threshold on γ̄ for which
γ2 > γ̄ implies V
h
2 (u
k
2) > V
d
2 (u
k
2). Re-arrange ā
1 such that
ā1 =
ϑ
(
ϑ+ κ2
)
[ϑ(1 + βγ̄1) + κ2] (ϑ+ κ2)− ϑ2βγ̄1
(239)
ā1 =
ϑ
(
ϑ+ κ2
)
(ϑ+ κ2)
2
+ ϑβκ2γ̄1
(240)
γ̄1 =
(
ϑ+ κ2
) (
ϑ−
(
ϑ+ κ2
)
ā1
)
ϑβκ2ā1
(241)
The coefficients associated to a2 in equation 234 (in particular: Σ) depend
on the initial guess γGT . γ
G
T is hence not necessarily equal to γ̄
1 (which is found
to satisfy equation 234 with equality if Σ is formed with γGT ). As a consequence,
we have to solve for the fixed point of γ̄ in equation 234 by continued iterations.
Proceed as follows: First, compute the difference between γGT and γ̄
I (where
γ̄I denotes γ̄ after I iterations). Second, if the difference between γGT and γ̄
I is
above some critical value, repeat the computation of āI (and the corresponding
γ̄I) with γI−1 as an input. Repeat until γI is sufficiently close to γ̄I and report
γ̄ = γ̄I .
For reasonable parameterization, there is a γT ≥ γ̄ ∈ [0, 1] such that
V h2 (ũ) > V
d
2 (ũ) for each potential shock sequence ũ. As a consequence, the
only consistent central bank credibility in T − 1 is γT−1 = 1. This finding
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confirms what was supposed to be true (namely γt = 1 ∀t < T is consistent
with strategic policy deviations if γT ≥ γ̄ ∈ [0, 1] and ρu = 0).
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